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Vietnam Report

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16 December 1982

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CONTENTS

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

Security in Coastal Village Properly Maintained (Nguyen Minh; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 22 Oct 82).....	1
Development of Local Military Engineer Units Studied (NHAN DAN, 25 Oct 82).....	3
Continuing Trials of Vietnamese Monks (Alan Dawson; BANGKOK POST, 17 Nov 82).....	5
CIA Agent Coming Home To Foment Resistance Arrested (Vu Manh Tuong; QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 21 Oct 82).....	7
Ho Chi Minh City Police Arrest Smugglers (Minh Phuong; TIEN PHONG, 26 Oct-1 Nov 82).....	10

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

France Eager To Increase Cooperation With Hanoi (Michel Blanchard; BUSINESS TIMES, 20 Oct 82).....	13
Briefs Food Aid Program for Vietnam	14

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

Revolution Said To Be Failing; Soviet Pressure Increases (Truong Nhu Tang; POLITIQUE INTERNATIONAL, Oct 82).....	15
Progress Said Being Made at Base Level in Binh Tri Thien (Vu Thang; NHAN, 26 Oct 82).....	26

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

Problems of Ho Chi Minh City Service Network Discussed (Bang Chau; NHAN DAN, 26 Oct 82).....	30
---	----

AGRICULTURE

Reason for Landslides in Central Vietnam Explained (Hoang Hung; HANOI MOI, 25 Oct 82).....	32
'NHAN DAN' Editorial Stresses Importance of Small Water Conservancy Projects (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 21 Oct 82).....	34
'NHAN DAN' Editorial Calls for Expansion of Legume Crops (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 25 Oct 82).....	36
Half of Long An Rice Area Attains Yield of 40 Quintals (NHAN DAN, 25 Oct 82).....	38
Editorial Discusses Freshwater Pisciculture (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 3 Nov 82).....	39
Exploitation of Marine Products Intensified (NHAN DAN, 3 Nov 82).....	42
Irrigation Units Fail To Pay Electricity Fees (NHAN DAN, 26 Oct 82).....	43

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

Haiphong Port Expansion Projects Completed (NHAN DAN, 23 Oct 82).....	44
--	----

LIGHT INDUSTRY

Handicrafts Weakened by Irrational Income Distribution (Xuan Vu; NHAN DAN, 5 Nov 82).....	45
Editorial Advocates Sericulture Development (Editorial; NHAN DAN, 6 Nov 82).....	47

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS

Vietnamese Workers, Soviet Technicians Compete in Building Hanoi Bridge (Bui Viet Phong; LAO DONG, 28 Oct 82).....	50
--	----

LABOR

Export of Laborers to Socialist Countries Assessed (Vu Quoc Hung; THANH NIEN, Sep 82).....	53
---	----

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

Storm Damage Overcome in Nghe Tinh (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 22 Oct 82).....	57
---	----

Sister Provinces Help Nghe Tinh Overcome Storm Aftermath (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 24 Oct 82).....	58
---	----

POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

Thousands of Laborers Moved to New Economic Zones (QUAN DOI NHAN DAN, 20 Oct 82).....	60
--	----

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

SECURITY IN COASTAL VILLAGE PROPERLY MAINTAINED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Oct 82 p 3

[Article by Nguyen Minh: "Tan Thuy, a Coastal Village with a Good Movement to Maintain Security"]

[Text] Situated in Ba Tri District (Ben Tre), Tan Thuy is a coastal village with a seashore stretching over more than 10 kms. The village's production collectives (seven fishing production collectives and eight salt producing, handicraft and agricultural production collectives) have begun to apply the system of product contract with laboring groups and individual laborers.

Over the past year, Tan Thuy has not only scored achievements in other fields but also ranked among villages which have conducted a fairly strong movement to maintain the fatherland's security.

Tan Thuy had educated, motivated, organized and led the masses to participate in the movement for the fatherland's security and to give it an in-depth dimension. After studying and trying to understand the actual situation at the grassroots level, we are of the opinion that Tan Thuy has been able to do so because it has considered practical activities highly important, actively led its various forces to take part in these activities and taken advantage of these activities to complement its plan, draw experiences and guide the movement.

By the end of August 1982, while building up and consolidating the militia, Tan Thuy had set up 117 people's security cells and formed 35 village public security agents, thus attaining a ratio of one people's security agent to three or four villagers. This ratio will be higher if the militia is taken into account. This [people's security] force is organized on the basis of residential centers and of each hamlet and household group--that is, 1 people's security cell composed of 3 or 4 men for every 20 to 25 households.

To enable these forces to carry out activities continuously, the planning task has played an especially important role. On the basis of the overall situation with its developments and taking specific factors and manifestations in each area into consideration, Tan Thuy has managed to draw up

a fairly concrete plan for action in each zone and to determine clearly each category of targets within its own territory and targets coming from other areas or infiltrating from the outside. A plan for the assignment of missions and the positioning of forces in each appropriate zone has been formulated and materialized by various programs concerning each specific point.

The forces in each zone or hamlet have organized closely coordinated activities on the actual terrain according to each corresponding plan and have trained themselves to carry out such plans in order to draw experiences and improve these plans.

By carefully formulating plans to put its forces into action, everyday Tan Thuy has had hundreds of its militiamen go on patrol and stand guard at important points along the coast and in the hinterland; at night, it has organized the strengthening of forces in charge of patrolling and standing guard on the spot. The militia has concentrated on satisfactorily fulfilling the task of maintaining combat alert, patrolling and standing guard to protect key targets in the village. The overall action plan and the individual one for each base have been carried out adequately according to a fixed pattern. Basic cadres have in turn fulfilled the stand-by duty, watched over the situation and performed supervision. A review of the situation has been made monthly to draw experiences and to set forth a specific theme and plan of action for the next month. As a result, the coordinated activities of the militia and people's security forces have proven rather effective. From 1981 to date, the militia and border defense forces have uncovered and caught dozens of cases of property theft and sabotage activities. In particular, the sea scouring militia have caught 12 cases of fleeing abroad by sea.

9332

CSO: 4209/77

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

DEVELOPMENT OF LOCAL MILITARY ENGINEER UNITS STUDIED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Oct 82 p 3

[Article by "P.V.": "Engineer Troops Study the Development of Local Military Engineer Forces"]

[Text] In the war of liberation in the past the local military engineer forces contributed greatly to the common accomplishments of the localities and of the nation. Their feats in building fences around combat villages, laying mines, digging trenches, ensuring communications, and building combat villages are part of history. In war to defend the homeland, many new problems have been posed, such as the missions of building defense lines, creating the battlefields position of people's war, combining the economy with national defense in each locality, and building local military engineer forces. Fully applying the Party's military line on local people's war to the military engineering work in war to defend the homeland is a great problem. The Military Engineer Command recently held a scientific conference to study that problem in order to gradually build strong local military engineer forces.

The report on "local military engineer forces in war to defend the homeland" of the Military Science Bureau concentrated on research on the role of local military engineer forces. At present, we are building border and coastal defense lines, while at the same time preparing the battlefield position rear-echelon localities. The local military engineer organs and the local military engineer forces must participate in preparing installations and maintain those installations during combat by the local armed forces. In the immediate future, they must positively prepare and build combat villages, plan and build installations at the district level, and develop the district into a fighting fortress.

The local military engineer forces consist of two principal components: the military engineer forces of the provincial and district local troops and the military engineer units of the militia and self-defense forces. In order to strongly develop those forces it is necessary to promptly determine a rational organizational structure for the local military engineer forces, and have a unified policy for training and using cadres. The specialized technical training of military engineers of the local units and of the military and self-defense units must be improved.

The military engineer representatives of military regions 1, 2, 3, and 5, and of the military commands of Hoang Lien Son and Lang Son provinces affirmed the great role of the local military engineers and the urgent requirement of bringing into play the strength of those forces in the mission of building a combat-ready battlefield position and defeating the enemy's many-sided war of destruction.

5616

CSO: 4209/83

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CONTINUING TRIALS OF VIETNAMESE MONKS

Bangkok BANGKOK POST in English 17 Nov 82 p 4

[Article by Alan Dawson]

[Text]

IT has been a year now since Hanoi abandoned efforts to unite all the Buddhists in Vietnam into a single church and simply formed a pro-regime Vietnam Buddhist Church at a government-sponsored, four-day religious meeting at historic Quan Su pagoda in the capital city.

Three and a half months later, on February 25 to be exact, police entered the grey, unimposing An Quang pagoda in the Cholon section of Ho Chi Minh City, arrested two of the monks there and took them away.

Behind these two acts is the continuing saga of the Unified Buddhist Church of Vietnam. It now is a saga of almost 20 years of fiery (sometimes literally), spectacular and unrepentant opposition to government authority by a group of Vietnamese monks, whose school of Buddhism allows — and even encourages — political action by the clergy.

In 1963, their suicides by fire prompted the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime. Twice more in the next two years the monks took to the streets in actions that felled two more Saigon governments. Their leader, the temperamental Thich (Venerable) Tri Quang, so infuriated Americans and their supporters that they dubbed him "the red monk."

Hanoi obviously wishes Tri Quang were red. Or even a pale pink. He and his followers remain as committed against the Hanoi government as ever they were against the Saigon governments of the 1960s.

The Ho Chi Minh City police de-

partment moved against An Quang last February under a city version of a national decree permitting authorities to take action against anyone "who could cause danger to order and security in important political, economic and strategic areas."

It was not the first fall for the pagoda since the communists took over Saigon and renamed it in April, 1975. Tri Quang has been under house arrest inside An Quang almost since the day of victory and other monks have been taken back and forth to re-education centres or other forms of detention.

A particularly stiff crackdown on An Quang came in 1976 following the self-immolation of monks and nuns from the Unified Buddhist Church in the Mekong Delta city of Can Tho. All available reports said the suicides were in protest against government actions against the church, including seizure of land.

One of the first victims was Thich Thien Minh. Thien Minh has a lengthy history of disobedience to government wishes. In 1969, he stood in the dock of a Saigon military court, on trial for his life charged with keeping weapons. He was convicted but not executed.

Thien Minh was pulled out of An Quang in 1976 and sent to a "re-education camp." He died there two years later.

With him at the time were two other monks: the elderly Thich Huyen Quang, who became acting chairman of the Unified Buddhist Church after Thien Minh's death, and Thich Quang Do, the Church's executive secretary. Quang Do and Huyen Quang were rearrested last

February. In addition, Quang Do's mother, who is 92 years old, was also detained by the city police.

Vietnamese officials in, among other places, London, have confirmed that the government holds Quang Do and Huyen Quang. They refuse to give other information, including place of detention or conditions of their confinement. Earlier this year, the Vietnamese media printed pictures of Quang Do and his mother, supposedly proving that they were alive but giving no details.

The Vietnamese have told several sources that the monks were arrested because they were in contact with unauthorised foreigners. These include, among others, former anti-war activist Joan Baez; Nobel Peace Prize winners Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams of Northern Ireland; US Jesuit and revolutionary Daniel Berrigan, and more than 80 other people and groups. Many of them were active in the anti-war groups of the 1960s and early 1970s.

A Vietnamese exile group in Paris believes from information it has collected in Vietnam that the monks were taken to their home provinces — central Binh Dinh for Huyen Quang and northern Thai Binh for Quang Do — and handed over to local officials for safe keeping under whatever terms the provincial authorities wished. There has been no confirmation of that report.

Such actions have been taken in the past under a Vietnamese law which permits the government to decide "place of residence" for any citizen in which it has an interest for any reason.

Other reports, also unconfirmed but in character, have said that Quang Do and Huyen Quang, like the dead monk Thien Minh, are undergoing intensive questioning to determine if they will confess to being CIA agents.

Several activists in Saigon who opposed the Thieu government but

who did not support the communists were painted with the CIA brush, including some still in re-education camps.

A number of Vietnamese exile groups and others including Amnesty International, are encouraging members and supporters to write to Prime Minister Pham Van Dong in Hanoi to inquire about the two arrested An Quang pagoda monks.

FOOTNOTE: The legal status of the Unified Buddhist Church is unclear, but one thing is.

The government has declared that the new Vietnam Buddhist Church, which has just celebrated its first anniversary, "is the only Buddhist organisation representing Vietnamese Buddhism in all relations in the country and with other countries."

And, again officially, the Unified Buddhist Church is one of nine Buddhist churches which was incorporated into the new church on its formation at the Hanoi conference.

The known leadership of the "official" Vietnam Buddhist Church predictably consists entirely of people who have long been identified with the Hanoi regime in the north or the Viet Cong in the south, with the northerners holding the bulk of the executive positions.

Its headquarters is Quang Su, a quiet and very old pagoda in Hanoi which is inhabited by a small group of mostly old monks and a few very old caretakers.

The so-called "Campaign Committee to Unify Buddhism" which was charged with bringing all the Buddhists under one roof in 1976 has apparently been dissolved.

Its leadership, which had a fairly large number of southerners, has mostly disappeared, although presumably those monks are lower-ranking members of the officially-recognised Vietnam Buddhist Church.

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

CIA AGENT COMING HOME TO FOMENT RESISTANCE ARRESTED

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Oct 82 p3

[Article by Vu Manh Tuong: "Unmasking the Enemy: Half a 100-Dong Puppet Banknote"]

[Text] Late at night, waves from the open sea beat the island rocks more noisily and fiercely. Having just finished his work Huynh Nam hastily switched the lamp to low and went to bed. Suddenly, there was a knock at the door. Nam sprang from his bed. He heard the shrill voice of a man asking from outside:

--Hi! Is this Mr Huynh Nam's house?

--Right! Who are you to come here at this time?--While speaking, Nam switched his lamp to high in order to see the stranger's face clearly but instead of answering, the latter quietly walked in and asked Nam:

--Do you remember Mr Truong Ha, don't you?

--Why do you ask me such a question?

--I am a close friend of Mr Truong Ha who wanted to ask you a favor...

After a pause, he added:

--Mr Ha had certainly told you about that in his recent letters...

--I know Mr Truong Ha. Formerly, he was my teacher at the psywar school in Mr Thieu's time but he had fled the country and gone abroad. I have received his letters regularly. He just sent me a letter last week from [Polatango] Island, Malaysia.

--He would certainly have told you that you would soon see a new friend?

--Yes, he did. But how can I believe you?

The man with the shrill voice continued to look Nam straight in the eye. Without saying a word, he switched the lamp to low with one hand, thrust the other into his vest pocket and took out half of a 100-dong banknote of the former puppet regime, saying curtly:

--Here we go! Let God be my witness!

Nam hastily picked up the half of the puppet regime's 100-dong banknote and tallied it with the other half in his possession. Seeing that the two halves coincided with each other, Nam said softly:

--I wish you success on your return to the country.

The man with the shrill voice hurriedly made a gesture with his hand and said:

--Be careful! If the border defense troops know about this, all of us will be put in fail! Lowering his voice, he added:

--At Mr Truong Ha's order, I have come back here from across the ocean as a "pioneer" for our "flock of birds" who have been living far from their fatherland for so long and to prepare for their flight back to their "nest." On behalf of the overseas "patriots," may I impart to you a piece of happy news: With the Americans' aid, our "Overseas Volunteers' Front" in the United States, France, Australia... is developing strongly with each passing day. Our "Front" over there will soon bring its troops here to coordinate their activities with those of your home forces.

Nam asked humbly:

--What should I do now?

The stranger said with a grin:

--Mr Truong Ha had told me many things about you but only now do I have the honor of meeting you. First and foremost, you should keep secret my return home from across the ocean. Only in case of absolute necessity will we communicate with each other according to a preagreed secret sign. Tomorrow, at H hour and P place, you shall be present to receive a coded message sent from abroad.

After the departure of the man with the shrill voice, Nam tossed and turned on his bed without getting any sleep. Nam heard the faraway voice of Truong Ha who shouted at his subordinates some 10 years ago: "I have only one principle--that is, fight communism to the end." As in a movie projected at low speed, the past episode when he committed sins in cooperation with Ha reappeared before Nam's eyes. However, ever since he came home after performing reformatory study, Nam had more peace of mind. Nobody in both the neighborhood and administrative circles had any prejudice against his past mistakes. On the contrary, they helped Nam and gave him a job while

his children were allowed to go to school normally. The time spent living under the new regime was acting as a tranquillizer and soothing the wound in Nam's heart. After today's meeting with Truong Ha's man, this wound suddenly became inflamed and cause a stinging pain.--How can I take a hand in sin again?--Nam asked himself painfully. Finally, he came to a decision, opened the door and walked in the direction of the border defense post...

The information given by Nam concurred with the documents provided us by primary organizations and, therefore, further clarified the suspicious intricacies in the infiltration case which our investigation teams were closely following and watching. After analyzing and assessing the situation, the post commander decided to "lock this decoy duck" in a cage and set a trap to lure the "other birds" in.

Exactly at the fixed time, Nam went to the agreed place to meet the man with the shrill voice and receive the coded message from abroad. On arrival, Nam sat down and waited for a very long time but did not see the man coming. Could he have suspected something and decided not to come to the appointed place. Or was it a further move on his part to "test" Nam before deciding to deliver the coded message?

It turned out to be a "trick" of his to test people. Therefore, it was very probable that he would return to the appointed place to meet Nam and hand him the secret message. The cadres at the post decided to intensify and tighten patrol along the seashore under the post's jurisdiction and simultaneously to direct a task force team to secretly lie in wait at the appointed place to look for the man. In fact, the man with the shrill voice reappeared the next week. Following the preagreed secret sign imparted by Nam, the secret border defense combatants rushed out, caught the man and brought him to the post for interrogation.

A body search of the man revealed a pistol, navigation instruments, a compass and a small mirror. When our combatants pulled out the back plate of the mirror, they found a coded message written in chemical ink and addressed by a foreign intelligence agency to the reactionaries in our country and which the man did not yet have time to deliver. Faced with such red-handed evidence, he bowed his head and pleaded guilty. His name was Ly Bong. A Vietnamese of Chinese descent, he fled to Malaysia in 1977, was recruited and trained by the CIA and sent back to Vietnam to carry out espionage activities.

9332

CSO: 4209/77

MILITARY AFFAIRS AND PUBLIC SECURITY

HO CHI MINH CITY POLICE ARREST SMUGGLERS

Hanoi TIEN PHONG in Vietnamese 26 Oct-1 Nov 82 p 3

[Article by Minh Phuong: "Silent Battles"]

[Text] The truck with the carefully covered bed and bearing licence plate No 6SA-1248 was detained by tax-inspection station No 4 in Binh Chanh District, Ho Chi Minh City. The driver, who had a sad expression and sharp eyes, presented his papers and said, "I'm only carrying export frozen shrimp for the state. There's nothing else!"

"Is that right?" said Nguyen Van Binh, the shift commander, who looked probingly at the truck driver. "That's right, I'm carrying nothing but frozen shrimp, believe me." "So let us inspect your truck," said Binh.

"No!" protested the driver, "You will ruin the state's frozen shrimp." He stressed the word "state" and intended to pick up the papers laying on the tax team's desk. Nguyen Van Binh stopped him and said, "If your truck isn't carrying contraband we'll accept complete responsibility. Don't worry." "O.K., go ahead and inspect it," replied the driver coldly.

Nguyen Nam Thanh, Nguyen Van Chau, and the members of the tax team walked around the truck and knocked on the suspicious places. When he reached the left side of the front of the truck, Thanh called over the truck driver and said, "Open up the panel of this headlight." "I won't open it, said the driver, his face reddening and his voice threatening, "So you intend to damage a state vehicle?"

"Perhaps the person who wants to damage a state vehicle is you, not us," replied Thanh calmly. He continued, "If you won't open it, we will," Thanh told Hue and Rop to bring their tools. The face of the driver Ton Thanh Kiet suddenly paled. The driver ran up to Nguyen Van Binh, offered him a cigarette, and implored, "Please tell your men to let me go. I'm offering you 10,000 dong for your own use. I'll give your men anything they want."

Nguyen Van Binh sternly looked at Ton Thanh Kiet and said, "Our honor is not something that can be bought and sold. I recommend that you witness the inspection of your truck."

The panel of the truck's headlight was opened. In a very small area, Ton Thanh Kiet had cleverly hidden 280 packages of Samit cigarettes. As he watched them pull

out the packages one-by-one and stack them on the sidewalk, To Thanh Kiet's face changed like a chameleon, first red and then grey. The truck's headlight was put back the way it was. Ton Thanh Kiet rubbed his hands and asked if he could sign a report and pay a fine. But the members of the tax team did not stop there. A second part of the truck -- a 200-liter gasoline can attached to the side of the truck -- was inspected. It was hard to believe that that professional blackmarketer could have been so meticulous. He had divided the gasoline can into two compartments, the outer of which contained gasoline while the inner one contained contraband goods. On that occasion he had hidden 800 packages of Samit cigarettes in the can.

After the 1,080 packs of cigarettes had been pulled out and piled on the sidewalk, Nguyen Van Chau, holding a flashlight, crawled underneath the truck and shined the light on the underside of the truck. Another secret was discovered: between layer of ice used to refrigerate the shrimp there was a large bag was a plastic-wrapped package of 1,500 meters of Thai orlon cloth worth 380 dong per yard.

In the district tax office, Ton Thanh Kiet admitted that he had modified the space behind the headlight and the gasoline can in order to bring in contraband goods from Rach Gia, where there was a blackmarket ring which use gold to buy cigarettes, cloth, chemicals, and watches from Thai merchants out at sea, and sold those goods on consignment to such people as Ton Thanh Kiet.

Ton Thanh Kiet had often "gotten past" the public security police and the tax organ, but his time he was discovered. The contraband he carried on his truck represented more than 10 taels of gold that had left the country and fled abroad.

After the land battle had ended, we went to the Cho Dem post on the river. It was raining that night. The current in the Cho Dem River was flowing swiftly. Nguyen Van Binh assigned an observer, then we went into a small building erected on the bank of the river to get out of the rain. The mobile tax team had six members. Nguyen Van Binh, born in Long An, was a reassigned soldier. His wife and family were in the country farming and were still encountering many difficulties. The wife of Nguyen Van Chau a disabled veteran, was a worker in a leather shoe enterprise in Ho Chi Minh City. With their small salaries, Chau and his wife had to scrape to make a living. But although they lived in an environment full of the seduction of money, Nguyen Van Binh and Nguyen Van Chau still manifested the qualities of communists. Those two young party members were good examples and solid bases of support for the four young Youth Union members: Nguyen Nan Thanh, Le Van Tam, Nguyen Van Rop, and Nguyen Tri Hue. They had worked together for the past 3 years and had uncovered many blackmarketers, but they still lived simple, pure lives. As we sat drinking tea, smoking Hoa Mai cigarettes, and talking, I felt very fond of them.

At about midnight the rain subsided. On the river, there appeared a rather boat which floated with the current. Nguyen Van Binh woke us up and signalled for the boat to tie up at the wharf. The boat owner, Tran Hong, about 50 years old, big, and husky, and chewing a cigarette holder, presented his papers and said in a polite voice, "I'm only carrying 500 barrels of sugar. We've already paid 50,000 dong in taxes. Here is the receipt."

Nguyen Van Binh used his flashlight to examine the boat and discovered that it did not have a licence plate. Another detail made Binh suspicious: a boat carrying

sugar should have started out from Ben Tre or Cuu Long, places with much sugar, so why did it originate at Chau Doc (An Giang), an "entrepot" for smuggled goods? Binh recommended that it let the tax team inspect the boat.

"O.K.," calmly replied the boat owner as he inhaled on his cigarette, "Go ahead and unload the 500 barrels of sugar to carry out your inspection. After you've finished you can put them back for me."

The 500 barrels of sugar weighed 30 tons, but there were only six men in the tax team. Tran Hong thought that they would not do that heavy work, so he was very relaxed. He didn't expect that they would do it.

The first barrel of sugar, the second barrel of sugar, and then the 150th barrel of sugar were taken ashore. Now, the expression on the face of boat owner Tran Hong was identical to that of truck driver Ton Thanh Kiet: it had changed from indifference and truculence to palleness and panic. Like, Kiet, he tried to bribe the team. He leaped aboard the boat, took out some beer and snacks, and smiled reluctantly and said, "Why go through all this trouble? I'm only guilty of transporting some cigarettes. If you let me go I'll give you 50,000 dong."

Fifty thousand dong, equal to 55 months' salaries of all six members of the team. As for as they were concerned, that was a large amount of money. But they were determined not to exchange their virtue for that money.

By noon the next day, all 500 barrels of sugar were taken ashore. Vo Phi Long, deputy head of the Binh Chanh District tax bureau, was invited by the members of the team to witness the results of the inspection. Under the final layer of sugar, the boat owner Tran Hong had hidden 5,000 meters of imported cloth, 1,000 packages of "555" cigarettes, imported cigarette wrapping paper, and hundreds of kilograms of chemicals, soap, and western medicine.

Tran Hong exchanged gold for those goods in the Tan Chau area in Chau Doc (An Giang). His blackmarket ring included hooligans and bourgeois merchants who had evaded reform and were scattered from the southern border area to Ho Chi Minh City. After obtaining the goods at low prices, they returned to the city and dispersed the goods in secret warehouses and released them for sale only after they spread rumors that "the situation on the border is unstable," or that such goods will no longer be unattainable, etc. Thus their prices increase greatly, by 50 percent or even 100 percent. That is the reason for the instability of market prices.

Since the end of 1981, said deputy tax office head Vo Phi Long, "We have discovered hundreds of blackmarketers such as Tran Hong and Ton Thanh Kiet on the southern approaches to the city. We collected for the state more than 30 million dong in evaded taxes. More important, we contributed to the mission of managing the circulation and distribution of goods and preventing speculation and blackmarketing.

FRANCE EAGER TO INCREASE COOPERATION WITH HANOI

Kuala Lumpur BUSINESS TIMES in English 20 Oct 82 p 19

[Article by Michel Blanchard in Ho Chi Minh City]

[Text]

THE visit to Vietnam of a French parliamentary delegation confirmed that France intends to increase its cooperation with Hanoi, in spite of disagreement over Kampuchea and the criticism the cooperation has provoked, observers said last Friday.

The visit, which ended on Thursday, showed once again Vietnam's wish for links with the non-communist world, to aid its economic development and to break its diplomatic isolation.

It has, however aggravated unease in Asian countries opposed to contacts with Hanoi. Earlier this month a French businessman signed a deal with Hanoi to supply agricultural machinery and machinery worth some US\$200 million.

Pact

Thailand for one, attacked the deal saying it would not bring peace or stability to South-East Asia.

The Association of South-East Asian nations (Asean) — grouping Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand — considers any aid given to Hanoi as tantamount to prolonging its military presence in Kampuchea.

President of the France-Vietnam parliamentary friendship group French communist party member Jacques Brunhes spoke in Hanoi of a "turning" in relations between the two countries.

The mission was intended to "give further impetus to the reinitiated cooperation" which

picked up again in 1981 having been "frozen" but not broken when Vietnam intervened in Kampuchea.

Giscard d'Estaing's government had signed loan agreements of 200 million francs, and subsequently a consular agreement.

The resumption of high-level contacts was marked by visits to Vietnam by Regis Debray, an advisor to the next President, Francois Mitterrand, and Socialist Minister of Research and Industry Jean-Pierre Chevenement.

Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach has been received in Paris by French Foreign Minister Claude Cheysson, and Vietnam stated on two occasions that it wanted to have relations with all countries, Western ones included.

Hanoi has stressed the "historic links" between France and Vietnam — a position which puts Hanoi within Paris' Third World policy, President Mitterrand said in October last year.

France has demanded the withdrawal of Vietnam's troops from Kampuchea, where they have been since ousting the Khmer Rouge regime in 1979, but it has not made it a pre-requisite of relations with Hanoi.

In the United Nations, France abstains from voting on this issue of the Kampuchea seat, held now by the anti-Vietnamese coalition government of Democratic Kampuchea, but which Phnom Penh wants declared empty.

The parliamentary delegation repeated Mr Cheysson's view that the Indochinese suggestion for an

international conference on South-East Asia was a "first step in the right direction."

The suggestion was made at the meeting this year of Indochinese Foreign Ministers in Ho Chi Minh City.

Problems

One of the mission's two Socialist Members of Parliament, Bernard Schreiner said: "It was not impossible that France might one day play a political role" in the region, if it were asked to, in helping a peaceful settlement of deadlocked problems.

The parliamentary mission, which was composed of representatives of the four major groupings of the majority and the opposition was received at a high level in Hanoi.

Members met president of the National Assembly, Nguyen Huu Tho, and gave him an invitation from his French counterpart Lois Mermax to visit France.

The mission was also received by Vice Premier in charge of science and technology, General Vo Nguyen Giap, who defeated French colonial forces in the first stage of the Vietnam war, and Vo Dong Giang, acting Foreign Minister.

It was the first time that a French parliamentary delegation has visited Vietnam since 1975 and it has attracted even greater attention abroad because it follows the signing of a five-year exchange agreement worth US\$200 million. — AFP

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, TRADE AND AID

BRIEFS

FOOD AID PROGRAM FOR VIETNAM -- THE 14th session of the Aid Policy and Programs Committee of the World Food Aid Program (CPA) of the World Food Organization (PAM), which was held in Rome between 11 and 20 October, approved a nutrition assistance project for Vietnamese mothers and children worth nearly 24 million dollars over a 4-year period. [Text] [Hanoi NHAN DAN 21 Oct 82 p 4] 5616

CSO: 4209/83

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

REVOLUTION SAID TO BE FAILING; SOVIET PRESSURE INCREASES

Paris POLITIQUE INTERNATIONAL in French Oct 82 pp 189-204

[Article by Trương Nhu Tang, founding member of the National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSV) (1960-1976) and former minister of justice under the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam (PRGRSV) (1969-1976), "boat people" refugee to France (1979-1980): "Vietnam: He Who Sows the Wind Shall Reap the Whirlwind"]

[Text] Can one believe in a destiny of peoples irremediably set by some higher force? By what historical stroke of fate should the Vietnamese people be doomed to shed its tears and blood indefinitely in a desperately dubious battle for a national unity constantly under siege, peace so often brought into question, and a most fragile independence? While in other places, others have been able, since the end of World War II, to wage a successful struggle for freedom and development, why should Vietnam continue to wallow in disaster? For three decades, by virtue of unending voluntarism and superhuman sacrifices imposed on a martyred population, the Vietnamese Communist Party has endeavored to combat what others call the "anathema" that seems to be striking the country. In 1945, the August revolution snatched an ephemeral independence from France that later had to be rewon by the force of arms. In 1954, while the victory was won at Dien Bien Phu, national unity was immediately lost in Geneva. In 1975, the war was finally won against the United States, but peace with neighboring countries was quickly broken. The matter is now settled: The Vietnamese Communist Party is also in the process of losing the revolution.

And yet, in April 1975, following their victory, did Ho Chi Minh's successors not finally have a chance to extract Vietnam from the whirlwind of history and devote themselves to the work of peace?

From Folly of Grandeur to Revolution Against People

The incredible collapse of the Saigon regime, caused less by a decisive battle in the field than by a breakdown of will in Washington, was, in the eyes of the leaders in Hanoi, "a historic opportunity that would not be repeated in 10,000 years."¹ Actually, it was not only an unexpected victory, but also a unique chance to win peace. But the Communist Party was intoxicated with the string of victories. It wanted everything and all at once: the forced

reunification of the country and accelerated expansion of collectivization of South Vietnam, the absorption of Laos and Cambodia and total control of Indochina, progression toward an avant-garde socialism through a triple revolution: socioeconomic, technical-scientific and ideological-cultural. The resolutions passed by the Fourth Congress of the party in December 1976 were marked by the thirst for grandeur. The Politburo dreamed of making Vietnam, if not all of Vietnamized Indochina, "a great leading Asian power before the year 2000." Gen Vo Nguyen Giap even spoke of a "nuclear strike force." Anything was possible, after all, because "the Vietnamese people had beaten the greatest power in history"!

As a result, continuation of a democratic, nonaligned South Vietnam, moving by stages toward the peaceful reunification of the country and guaranteeing a balanced structure in Indochina (according to the plan laid out by the 1973 Paris Accords), was doomed. The National Liberation Front and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam would, to use the expression of one of my colleagues, a Cabinet minister, be "buried without ceremony, without any funeral or funeral oration."² The liquidation of these two organizations, which had made it possible for the Vietnamese Communist Party to win on the southern front and internationally, was made all the more necessary because toward the end of the war, the revolutionary aura and of the PRGRSV was beginning to surpass that of the Vietnamese Communist Party, which could not offend the internal and international credit of the successors of Ho Chi Minh. Did they also harbor some fears about the prospects of a South Vietnam which, recognized internationally, might once again escape their control?

The totalitarian deception was revealed during the earliest days of the "liberation." At the victory celebration on 15 May 1975 in Saigon, the NLF flag disappeared from the military parade. The victory was immediately diverted for the sole credit of the Vietnamese Communist Party.

Power was going to be confiscated, or at least, what remained of it in South Vietnam. Overtaking the North Vietnamese Army already in place, one witnessed the onslaught of political, administrative and economic officials from governmental organs in the North, fighting (sometimes using guns) over public buildings, official residences, factories, housing, automobiles and even furniture! The establishment of Goulags throughout the Vietnamese territory was also part of the totalitarian logic. It was all the more inevitable because the Communist Party had only some 200,000 members in South Vietnam,³ which was a relatively small number given the extent of the total victory.

The victorious Communist Party was afraid of its new power in the South. A Politburo directive during the summer of 1975 stated that "it is better to erroneously arrest 100 innocent people than to let a single reactionary go free." Thus, prisons, reeducation camps, new economic zones and relocations of the people were part of a vast program to wipe out opposition and political, religious or ethnic dissidence. Born of the dialectic of Soviet history and the unknown elements of the Vietnamese heritage, the Goulag is now part of the Vietnamese scene. And yet, a recent report of Amnesty International did not hesitate to use a figure given by the authorities in Hanoi themselves: 26,000 political prisoners, a ridiculous figure wide of the mark. Actually, as indicated by a counterreport from the Vietnamese League of Human Rights,

there are still 500,000 political prisoners, without counting persons moved by the military to new economic zones, created *ex nihilo* in the unhealthiest regions of Vietnam. For the category of military men from the old regime alone, 40,000 officers and noncommissioned officers and 28 generals remain in the camps.⁴ Traveling companions of the communists who were far too independent during the resistance were also thrown into prison, along with countless members of the third force, either Catholic or Buddhist.

For my part, I vigorously protested this policy of revenge against the South beginning in the fall of 1975. "One could not preach for entire years the policy of national reconciliation and harmony and then pursue a policy of repression aimed at an innocent people!"⁵ But the Vietnamese Communist Party was stricken with the "besieged citadel" complex. After the victory, it continued to act paranoically with regard to the South Vietnamese population. Even today, seven years after the "liberation," it refuses to be liberated!

The idea of an avant-garde revolution made the Hanoi leaders lose their heads. The Politburo had boasted of being able to erect a model society, leaping directly from a state of extreme underdevelopment to advanced socialism, without going through the stage of capitalism, this in the absence of any material industrial base and any national and foreign investments. The Vietnamese Communist Party undoubtedly hoped "to progress rapidly, vigorously and solidly toward socialism" thanks to the Soviet working class and technical assistance from the USSR. The economic collectivism defined at the Fourth Congress in 1976 in order to support the new 5-year plan (1976-1980) perfectly respected the Soviet orthodoxy, which had failed in North Vietnam as it had everywhere else in the communist world. Consequently, after preaching economic independence and dignity ad nauseum, the country is now in a position in the most paradoxical mendicancy possible.⁶

The "North-malization" [*nord-malisation*] of South Vietnam turned into catastrophe, draining its agriculture down to the last rice bin in the Mekong Delta. The result: an annual deficit of 2.2 million tons of rice, according to FAO figures. Far from liberating productive forces, the establishment of state collectivism that was both centralizing and bureaucratic completed the job of chaining them. But with a party in power that claims to follow Soviet classicism -- Stalinism -- does Vietnam has any chance of escaping all the aberrations of real socialism? Whatever the case, it cannot free itself from the peasant evil, a trait peculiar to Asian communism. In fact, Vietnamese communism remains above all a peasant communism, in total contradiction with the Marxism-Leninism it claims to follow. Since the party cannot hope to undertake an avant-garde revolution except with the working class -- almost nonexistent in Vietnam -- it must eliminate its own peasant elements, called "Maoist" for this purpose. Consequently, since 1975, successive purification campaigns have been unleashed against the peasants who, forged in the guerrilla school, no longer know what to do with their new power in peacetime. Whatever the case, one has difficulty seeing how the Vietnamese revolution can, by devouring its own children, manage to protect itself from a great leap backward.

The party has also embarked upon a curious process of degeneration, although the system was already incurable. But the bureaucracy, institutionalized by

the regime as the "collective master of the working people," has ended up by degenerating into a system of collective irresponsibility and indifference, especially since with the "pauperization of all the people," bureaucracy unfailingly leads to corruption which, in return, feeds bureaucracy. While behind "the smokescreen of old formulas carved in a rigid language increasingly devoid of meaning" the new Mandarins administer the impasse, a veritable "kleptocracy" (much more rapacious than the one operating in the people's democracies of East Europe) is formed within the party-state. And for good measure, Le Duan, secretary general of the party, regularly vituperates "the degenerate and corrupt elements that have dishonored the party."⁷

Even the bureaucratic exercises of Chinh Huan -- ideological rectification -- are not able to break the spiral of corruption that has taken over the North, "as a kind of Southern revenge." Let it be said in passing that this is all the more natural since the government itself practices a racket policy with regard to the bourgeois elements and other class enemies to be shipped out by sea! Has the party not organized actual official trafficking in the boat people" that in 1979 put some 25 tons of gold into the state's leaking coffers? By monopolizing power and privileges at all levels and by becoming one with the state, the party has only generalized the corruption cancer. The revolution is rotten.

Even more dangerous for the future of the regime is the ever widening gap between the party-state and the people. It is a "fish out of water." Despite the contraction of the civilian society, combed by the Ho Khau regime, and control over the stomach by food rationing, multifaceted resistance attests to the unconquerable vitality of the Vietnamese people and their thirst for freedom. In their misfortune, they have not lost their sense of humor, now a formidable weapon: "If tomorrow the party grants automatic freedom to emigrate," it is frequently said, "then even the candelabra in Saigon will leave!" If the boat people continue to flee Vietnam, a tragedy never before seen in national history, it is simply because the revolution is being made without the people. And against the people.

From Will for Power to Dependency on USSR

Beginning in 1977, the open war between Socialist Vietnam and Democratic Kampuchea once again demonstrated the inability of the Vietnamese Communist Party to found peaceful coexistence between the peoples of Indochina. Could this party live only in and through war? Did it truly want peace? Whatever the case, one cannot understand the relaunching of the third war in Indochina without referring to the will for power that has always motivated the leaders in Hanoi. Ho Chi Minh had one great design, defined as early as the 1930's by the Comintern: making Indochina a socialist bloc. The Vietnamese Communist Party was subsequently to have complete responsibility for the revolutionary movement on the peninsula, a vocation that Ho Chi Minh's successors do not intend to see contested today. After 1975 and in the absence of other means already tested in the absorption of Laos, was force not finally needed to conquer Cambodia? The confrontation had been germinating in the resolutions adopted at the Fourth Congress in 1976, which in vaguely poetic, but nevertheless explicit, terms "indefectibly linking Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam, like

three tributaries of the same river," looked to the march toward Indochinese unification. War was inevitable between the Khmers Rouges and Vietnamese communists, because the survival of the one group, fiercely nationalistic, was incompatible with the strategy of the other particularly dominating group. Furthermore, during the period of the famous Indochinese Front (1970-1975), a silent struggle already pitted them against one another in the underground and the Khmers Rouges were beginning to physically eliminate the Khmers Vietminh trained in the Hanoi school.

Such an attitude pointed toward a veritable fight to the death between brother communist enemies, with the Vietnamese Communist Party initially hoping to "eat up" the Khmer Communist Party "from the inside." With the occupation of Laos and Cambodia, is the grand design of the Indochinese Communist Party now completed? Le Duan did not hesitate to proclaim it openly on 21 May 1981, before the Fourth Congress of the Revolutionary People's Party of Kampuchea: "The alliance between the three Khmer, Lao and Vietnamese peoples now constitutes a monolithic bloc that no maneuver, however perfidious it might be, will break."⁸

The fascination which the Soviet hegemonic model long had for the Hanoi leaders was such that as good disciples of Stalin, they transposed the example of the East European glaze on Indochina. Under the pressure of arms, friendship treaties were concluded between Hanoi and its Lao and Cambodian satellites, thus sanctioning the Indochinese bloc, the tropical version of the Warsaw Pact. They pushed their mimicry to the point of adopting, in April 1981, a new constitution copied after the Soviet model. Naturally, the Lao and Khmer Communist parties had to imitate the Vietnamese example. After the signing of the treaty of alliance between Moscow and Hanoi on 17 November 1978, the Soviet and Vietnamese Communist parties agreed henceforth to consider Vietnam as a "safe forward post" of socialism in Southeast Asia."⁹

And yet, whatever Le Duan might say, the task does not seem to be completed, for the Soviets have given their Vietnamese allies the task of training, not only Lao and Cambodian communists at the Hoa Binh Central School, but Thai, Malaysian and Burmese communists as well. The Soviet-type revolution remains to be exported at the point of bayonets. At the Nguyen Ai Quoc Institute, the party leadership school, they are already dreaming of a Union of Socialist Republics of Southeast Asia for the 1990's! One can see it now: Socialist Vietnam will be called upon to become a "mini USSR" in the region. Having said that much, what precise role do Ho Chi Minh's successors intend to make their country play in the future? That of a new Cuba or a new East Germany? Or both at once? The fact remains that the friendship treaty concluded between East Berlin and Hanoi in December 1977 solemnly affirmed "the special responsibilities of the GDR and the Republic of South Vietnam in the defense of the socialist community, one in the heart of Europe and the other on the steps of Asia."¹⁰ Should the scope of such a mission still be any doubt? Not only is Socialist Vietnam an integral part of the Soviet camp since its entry into CEMA in June 1978, but, as Helene Carrere d'Encausse accurately emphasized, it is a "veritable projection of the Soviet state," even "an expansion of a system which is the prolongation of the Soviet state."¹¹ Today, Socialist Vietnam has definitely become "the defender of Soviet order and the legionary of its future."¹²

Since the advent of Brezhnev, the USSR has seen the advantage it could derive from the Vietnamese Communist Party's will for power. After 1975, by giving Hanoi the means to complete its hegemony over all of Indochina, it is pursuing three major and complementary objectives: first of all, helping to build a new power pole, a barrier to the growing influence of China in Southeast Asia; second, helping to create a lasting antagonism between Peking and Hanoi, transposing the Sino-Soviet conflict onto the southern flank of China; and finally, consolidating a strategic support base there in order to develop a gradual policy of force throughout the entire region.

It will be noted that these objectives were part of the logical extension of the major challenge taken up by Leonid Brezhnev in 1965: to halt and beat the United States in Southeast Asia, while eliminating China from it. They were thus part of a broader strategy on the scale of the Asian continent and aimed at containing China through a system of collective security proposed in June 1969, on the one hand, and undertaking a double strike at the South, through the Gulf and Southeast Asia, in order to threaten in the future any movements of the merchant and military fleets of the Western world. For Moscow, the integration of Vietnam into the Soviet system in full expansion was therefore of cardinal importance, especially since it represented the missing link in its entire naval strategy for Asia and the Pacific. Should one then be surprised at the constancy with which the USSR has heretofore financed the regional expansionism of Hanoi?

Between 1965 and 1975, Moscow furnished \$5 billion in military aid and \$1.6 billion in economic aid to its Vietnamese ally. By December 1975, the Soviets agreed to finance up to 60 percent of the Vietnamese 5-year plan (1976-1980) for the sum of \$3.2 billion, while agreeing to reorganize the already over equipped army. After the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia, military and economic aid amounted to \$3 million a day, \$1.1 billion for 1979. This aid has since doubled, reaching \$2.2 billion in 1981, 50 percent in military aid, representing 16.7 percent of the total amount of Soviet military aid abroad. In July 1981, a series of economic agreements were signed. The USSR agreed to finance some 100 industrial projects in Vietnam, on the condition that the new Vietnamese 5-year plan (1981-1985) would be integrated into the Soviet Gosplan. The facts speak for themselves, clearly expressing the solidity of the hegemonic convergency between Moscow and Hanoi.

The Moscow-Hanoi can only be an integral alliance. Hanoi naturally dictates its law on Phnom Penh and Vientiane. But Moscow also dictates its law on Hanoi, to such an extent that a new saying among the Vietnamese people sarcastically states: "If they talk about brother parties and not parties of friends, it is because one cannot choose one's brother." How could it be otherwise within the Soviet family? Limited sovereignty is the rule of the day! As early as May 1975, the Soviets talked to the Provisional Revolutionary Government about the possibility of using military bases built by the Americans in South Vietnam. At that time, we categorically refused, but the leaders in Hanoi finally had to yield. Did the Soviet-Vietnamese treaty include a secret protocol of agreement providing for the turning over of the Cam Ranh and Da Nang bases to the USSR? On 14 May 1979, Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Firioubine did not hesitate to recall in Tokyo that "the presence of

Soviet ships in Vietnamese ports is a duty imposed by the treaty of friendship."¹³ In March 1979, Soviet warships, including nuclear submarines, made their first entry there. Some 10,000 Soviet advisers are now working in Indochina, with 4,000 assigned to exclusive administration of military bases.

The economic dependency is even more dramatic. By the end of 1981, Hanoi's foreign debt amounted to over \$3 billion, most to Moscow. Its foreign exchange reserves fell to \$80 million. According to the "socialist division of labor," Vietnam is to develop the exportation of certain raw materials (coal, rubber, tea, coffee) and certain handicrafts products going to CEMA countries and at prices far below those on the world market. While the Vietnamese people are starving, Vietnam now exports vegetables and other market garden crops to none other than eastern Siberia! Information given by the "Foreign Report" and confirmed by other sources is even more alarming, describing a program to export Vietnamese labor, drawn up at the 34th session of CEMA in the spring of 1981, in order to allow Hanoi to wipe away its debts.¹⁴ Thus, 500,000 "guest workers" are called upon to emigrate to the USSR and other Eastern countries, among which workers there are certainly "elements undesirable" to Vietnam. After the evacuation of the boat people, what would Hanoi not do to feed its war policy? But dependency begets dependency and the trade is increasingly unequal.

Future of Vietnam

It was in a climate of national disaster that the Fifth Congress of the Vietnamese Communist Party was held at the end of March 1982. The extent of the crisis faced by the party can be measured by the length of the plenary sessions preceding the congress, repeatedly postponed for a year. But "the mountain gave birth to a mouse." The ouster from the Politburo of six members, including comrades of Ho Chi Minh such as Gen Vo Nguyen Giap, undoubtedly constitutes a surprise without precedent in the annals of Vietnamese communism. And yet, the upheaval is only apparent. While the Dien Bien Phu victor, the former minister of foreign affairs (Nguyen Duy Trinh) and the former head of the economy (Le Thanh Nghi) had to give up their places and thus bear the blame for the current disaster, Le Duan was confirmed as secretary general of the party. The progression of the generals and pro-Soviet elements to the top only confirms the stepped up militarization of the regime and the growing control of Vietnam by the USSR.

Those still clinging to their old attachments to China saw their power further cut, despite their new anti-Chinese positions. At the Fourth Congress in 1976, the defender of the line of friendship with Peking, Hoang Van Hoan, now exiled in China, was eliminated from the Politburo.¹⁵ Only Truong Chinh (Long March) was once again able to retain his place, thanks to his solid foothold in the structure. Chairman of the State Council, he does not have a well-defined role. However, this reshuffling of the cards has left the main bosses of Vietnamese communism in their place, thus maintaining and for some time to come the old factionist struggles that have racked the party since the disappearance of Ho Chi Minh. The new strong man in Hanoi seems to be apparatchik Le Duc Tho, the enigmatic negotiator of the 1973 Paris Accords. Responsible for party organization for 30 years, will he nevertheless be able to

arbitrate between the different groups with their regionalistic and ideological variations? What man of compromise will be able to replace Prime Minister Pham Van Dong, exhausted by 30 years of bureaucracy? Finally, can the arrival of the "young sexagenarians" almost at the top triumph over the party's grave age crisis? These are all uncertainties that continue to hang over the future of the leadership in Hanoi. So long awaited, the Fifth Congress will in the end have resolved nothing.

Nor was the Fifth Congress able to solve the economic dilemmas in which the party has been trapped since the 11th plenary meeting of September 1979. Despite harsh self-criticism -- a mere exercise in political tautology -- on "the inadequacies and errors of the different party and government organizations, from the central echelon on down, in leadership and economic and social administration," no clear line was set forth. Behind the old biting formulas, a dubious compromise was worked out between the dogmatics, who have not given up the socialist transformation of agriculture in South Vietnam, and the pragmatics who have demanded the introduction of certain market mechanisms, even in the North. However, profit unequally introduced in collectivized sectors further accelerates corruption and the black market more than it boosts the economy, while at the same time whipping up inflation.

Internationally speaking, the line is much clearer. "Solidarity and cooperation in all domains with the Soviet Union represent the cornerstone of the foreign policy of the party and state." This total alliance is, according to Le Duan, the "guarantee of the victory of the task of defending the country and building socialism for our people, as well as of the consolidation of national independence and the position of socialism on the Indochinese peninsula."¹⁶ Clearly, it is henceforth the USSR that will ensure the everlasting regional hegemony of Hanoi!

By his proclamations of solidarity with the Soviet Union, was Le Duan, whose election is a pledge given to Moscow, trying to link the USSR to Vietnam as intimately as Vietnam is linked to the USSR? Does he have some doubt about the solidity of the alliance? Does Moscow and Hanoi's solidarity not stem from a historical convergence? These are the key questions. At any rate, within the current context of the three-cornered game: the USSR-China-the USA, which the leaders in Hanoi seem to fear the most, the unconditional alignment with the USSR can only worsen Vietnam's diplomatic difficulties. And yet, the leaders in Hanoi should know better than anyone that Stalin's party has always placed its interests before those of the brother parties! But the party of Ho Chi Minh thinks that it has no other choice. And that is precisely why the total alliance with the USSR has become, to use Le Duan's words, "a principle, a strategy and at the same time, a revolutionary feeling."

Some perhaps hoped that the leaders in Hanoi would be capable of a radical change in political line at the Fifth Congress, given the mortal impasse into which Vietnam was led. This would have been a failure to recognize the nature of Vietnamese communism, which is essentially a war communism based on a will for power in all fields. This will for power is insane and seems to be inversely proportionate to the moral and material capacities of the Vietnamese Communist Party. Its exaggeration is equalled only by the extent of the

weaknesses inherent in the economic and social structures of a poor, under-developed country bled white by 30 years of uninterrupted war. But has this party not always lived above its station? Has it not constantly made the Vietnamese people pay a tremendous price for its forced voluntarism? Today as yesterday, it continues to play the sorcerer's apprentice, trying to use Soviet power to satiate its own thirst for power. And, let us repeat, if the USSR finances the occupation of Cambodia, it is because Hanoi's war communism functions as an effective instrument of the Soviet world hegemonic system. Moreover, this war is but the chain by which Moscow intends to attach Vietnam to the Soviet slave ship. That is why, despite the immense difficulties of its adventure in Cambodia, Hanoi still feels supported enough in order, to use Pham Van Dong's words, "to move ahead toward the glorious summits of socialism." Despite the growing cost of the conflict, the USSR still has the means to carry Socialist Vietnam, like a sword and shield. Here again, those who now speculate on the divergencies pitting Moscow against Hanoi on this matter are building castles in air. The fact that some Western countries hope to help Vietnam cut this Gordian knot is theoretically praiseworthy. But to hope to find a compromise solution with Hanoi on Cambodia, especially given the current imbalance of forces, is illusory. Likewise, to believe that it is possible to extract Vietnam from the Soviet orbit by distributing a few "tokens of credit" translates a real lack of understanding of the foreign policy of Hanoi and of that of Moscow.

There remains one last problem: Vietnam's relations with China. Without a doubt, the alliance with the USSR strengthens Hanoi's ability to follow the Soviet example in East Europe. But does this complicity not thereby increase China's determination to destabilize the Vietnamized and pro-Soviet Indochina? Ho Chi Minh's successors should have remembered that China has continually spoken out, since Geneva, for the neutrality of Cambodia and Laos, considered to be both a bulward against any outside intervention and an assurance against Hanoi's expansion. They undoubtedly did not learn the lesson which Tito derived from the Soviet-Yugoslav crisis in June 1948. Just as Stalin could not tolerate the constitution of a Balkan Federation (under the aegis of Belgrade) that might upset its sphere of influence, Mao Zedong could not accept the idea of an Indochinese bloc dependent on the Soviet Union. Was the "lesson" given by the Chinese Communist Party to the Vietnamese Communist Party in February 1979 not sufficiently clear? How could the Chinese communists pardon the Vietnamese communists for, to quote Confucius, "deceiving the master and betraying the friend" (*lua thay phan ban*)? This is all the more true because between 1950 and 1975, China was the great rear base of North Vietnam and the total value of Chinese aid exceeded \$20 billion. Chinese leaders told me in Beijing in 1980 that "China could never forgive the ingratitude of the people of Hanoi."¹⁷ In backing Cambodia, Socialist Vietnam walked into a big trap stemming from a broader conflict pitting China against the USSR on a continental scale. Could Vietnam live for long with bad relations with China, with which it must share the same borders? It is likely that at the first clap of thunder between the two communists powers which, to use Mao's words, "no longer want to share the same skies," Vietnam would not fail to be hit by the first bolt of lightning. The military arsenal that the Soviets are building up in Indochina only increases the probability. Cambodia's occupation is antihistoric and the alliance with the USSR antigeopolitical.

War is not a matter of fate. If a regime seems cursed, it is only because the choices made by its leaders have continually turned out to be catastrophic. Following their victory in 1975, the leaders in Hanoi should have extracted the "lessons of Vietnam" for themselves. They are clear.

First of all, reconciliation and national harmony are an absolute necessity because the continuation of civil war in other forms inevitably leads to the disintegration of the country's live forces. Any elimination of a large fraction of the population from national life can only create conditions propitious for intervention, whether direct or indirect, by outside powers.

On the intra-Indochinese level, what is in question in relations between Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam is not their disparity, but the role which Vietnam intends to play in Indochina. Peaceful coexistence is the only way. Hegemonism is anachronistic and leads straight to war.

Finally, the policy of alignment with a power outside the Asian continent only accentuates the struggle of influence waged, through other nations put in the middle, by the great powers in Southeast Asia. Neutrality is the only alternative to the policy of blocs.

In 1975, the crux of the matter was South Vietnam. The establishment of a national unity government made up of three parties was the cornerstone of any structure provided for by the 1973 Paris Accords. A free and democratic South Vietnam, neutral and truly nonaligned, a window open to the West and cooperating with all countries, could have ensured the establishment of a new structure for peace and balance in Indochina. But the permanent totalitarian temptation and the will for power caused the Vietnamese Communist Party to commit serious strategic and tactical, but especially geopolitical mistakes. Could one have expected, on the part of the leaders in Hanoi, a mental revolution that would have freed them from their war communism? Today I do not believe so, given the fact that they stubbornly cling to the well worn ideology of the Comintern and a war-mongering, unilateral dialectic serving interests that no longer have anything to do with those of the Vietnamese people. But is Vietnamese communism not, as it is increasingly involved, in the process of finally getting inextricably caught in its own hypothetical dilemmas? There is a boomerang effect. He who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind!

FOOTNOTES

1. After Saigon fell, the entire Hanoi press took up the theme "History has put on the thousand-league boots" (NHAN DAN, 1 and 15 May 1975). During the fatal months of March and April 1975, the debate that occupied the Politburo day and night was whether or not they should seize the *Thoi Co* (the opportune time) because of the paralysis of the American Executive Branch and the rout of the South Vietnamese Army and thus hasten the military conquest of South Vietnam.
2. The expression belongs to Tran Buu Kiem, who expressed surprise, at the meeting to plan reunification of the country in July 1976, over the suggestions made by Truong Chinh in favor of the accelerated march.

3. This figure was somewhat exaggerated by the Vietnamese Communist Party to the number of 1.5 million members throughout the country in 1975.
4. The Amnesty International report was not made public until July 1981, although its mission had been in Vietnam since 1979. The counterreport from the Vietnamese League of Human Rights was made public on the occasion of the 33d anniversary of UN Human Rights Day on 10 December 1981.
5. At my proposal, a bill regulating searches and arrests was passed in the fall of 1975. I later totally detached myself from the policy of repression aimed at the South Vietnamese population, refusing in 1977 a post as vice minister in the new unified government of Vietnam.
6. The observation was made by Georges Boudarelle: "The Difficult Birth of a Congress," LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE, April 1982.
7. Speech by Le Duan on the 50th anniversary of the Vietnamese Communist Party on 3 February 1980 (NHAN DAN of 4 February 1980). This same formula was repeated in his last report to the Fifth Congress (NHAN DAN, 27, 28 March 1982).
8. NHAN DAN, 22 May 1981.
9. In fact, as early as 28 June 1978, after Vietnam entered CEMA, Leonid Brezhnev launched this now well-known formula.
10. NHAN DAN, 5 December 1977. The same formula was repeated in the East German-Vietnamese joint communique of 20 December 1981, at the time of the visit by Heinz Hoffmann, minister of defense of the GDR, to Hanoi, NHAN DAN, 21 December 1981.
11. Helene Carrere d'Encausse, "Moscow's Designs and Possibilities in Asia," REVUE DE DEFENSE NATIONALE, November 1979, p 24.
12. The expression belongs to Thai Quang Trung, "The Cambodian Stakes in the Balance in Southeast Asia," POLITIQUE ETRANGERE, No 3/81, p 643.
13. LE MONDE, 16 May 1979.
14. THE ECONOMIST'S FOREIGN REPORT, 17 September 1981, INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 4 and 9 November 1981.
15. Hoang Van Hoan was eliminated from the Politburo, along with 27 of the 69 members and alternate members of the Central Committee, including Ly B Ly Ban and Ngo Minh Loan.
16. Political report to the Fifth Congress, NHAN DAN, 27 March 1982.
17. During that trip to China, during which I was received by Zhao Ziyang, new prime minister, I engaged in numerous talks with top Chinese foreign policy officials.

PARTY ACTIVITIES AND GOVERNMENT

PROGRESS SAID BEING MADE AT BASE LEVEL IN BINH TRI THIEN

Hanoi NHAN in Vietnamese 26 Oct 82 p 3

[Article by Vu Thang, Secretary of the Binh Tri Thien VCP Committee: "Political Activity in Binh Tri Thien: Creating a Strong Trong Transformation at the Basic Level"]

[Text] Overcoming conservatism and sluggishness:

The accomplishments of the party organization and people of Binh Tri Thien during the past several years in the political, economic, cultural, social, national defense, and security spheres have been quite comprehensive. Most outstanding have been the effective resolution of the food problem, the creation of jobs for workers, the transformation of the old production relations in the southern part of the province, and the steady advancement of the mass revolutionary movement. Grain output amounted to 450,000 tons and nearly met the province's needs. With the slogan "the people and the state work together," many additional material-technical bases of socialism were built in the province. On the water conservancy front, the people contributed tens of millions of workdays in building more than 800 large-scale Nam Thach Han water conservancy project, the Thao Long salinity-prevention dam, the Trieu Hai sand-prevention project, the Vuc Noi reservoir, and lake Tien Lan. In 1981 the value of the province's fixed property was four times greater than in 1976. Many new elements have appeared. In agriculture, the Thuy Duong cooperative in the city of Hue attained an average of 10.3 tons of paddy per hectare per year. Dozens of cooperatives, such as Dong Phuoc, Phu Thuan, Dien An, Quang Tho, and Dong Phu in Hung Dien District, Dong Giang, Long Hung, Tram Ly, and Dai An Khe in Trieu Hai District, etc., attained yields of between 70 to 85 quintals per hectare.

However, the province still has many weaknesses and deficiencies. The grain problem has not yet been fully resolved. During the past several years progress had been made in the intensive cultivation of rice, but the various kinds of subsidiary food crops have declined with regard to both area and yield. Clothing is still completely dependent on the central echelon. Few consumer goods are produced locally. Electricity, coal, gasoline, and oil are in short supply. Market management is not yet good. Prices are not stable. The value of exports is too low in comparison to the goods imported by the central echelon and does not correspond with the existing capability of the locality. The small budgets -- from the provincial level down to the district and village levels -- greatly restrict the exploitation of economic potential.

One of the reasons for the above-mentioned situation is the disease of conservatism and sluggishness. The echelons and sectors in the province have manifested a spirit of self--criticism and criticism, and have severely criticized the damage done by that disease with regard to their party organizations, in order to take steps to resolutely and urgently overcome them. The most concentrated manifestation of the disease of conservatism and sluggishness is that everything depends on the upper echelon. The work style lacks dynamism and liveliness. Agricultural production is still monoculture in general. The combining of industry and agriculture from the beginning and at the basic level is not explicit. Industry has not yet done a good job of serving agriculture. Production has not yet been combined closely with distribution, circulation, and socialist commerce. Economic management has not yet escaped from the administrative, bureaucratic, supply-as-needed style. Conservatism and sluggishness are still manifested in the form of partialism and localism. The province has not and localism. The province has not yet boldly delegated authority to the district echelon. Many village party organizations in the northern part of the province have hundreds of party members but are not strong because the average age of a party member is about 50. Many party organizations and party chapters in the southern part of the province have few party members, and nearly all of them are retired cadres. Many production bases and schools do not yet have party members. Party development is slow. The various echelons have not yet boldly promote young cadres and cadres who are educated, have economic and technical knowledge, and have a spirit of daring to think and do and daring to accept responsibility. Some party organizations are still conservative and sluggishness because most of their party members matured in the national democratic revolution and have political knowledge, but lack knowledge of economic management and have low educational levels, so it is difficult for them to assimilate new things in economic guidance. Conservatism and sluggishness are also caused by a mandarin attitude toward their accomplishments in the resistance wars against foreign aggression, or by satisfaction over their accomplishments in self-sufficiency production. Such people are unwilling to study advanced models in order to keep up with the requirements of the new revolutionary missions. Therefore, many problems in economic management cannot yet be resolved.

With regard to the upper echelon's guidance of and assistance for the lower echelon, although they say that they are oriented toward the basic level, many provincial and district sectors have not yet taken specific steps to help the basic level draft and implement a production-commercial direction, and solve for the basic level problems and restraints in economic-social management.

Objectives and activities:

Implementing the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress, and on the basis of the province's actual economic-social situation, we clearly determined the mission of building socialism in the locality, and resolutely defeated the enemy's many-sided war of destruction, while at the same time always taking the initiative in preparing to cope with all contingencies of the enemy's war of destruction. First of all, the party organization and people of the province will attain four economic-social objectives between now and 1985: First, meeting the food needs and part of the clothing needs, and most of the essential consumer goods needs; create stable employment for unemployed workers; and increase the sources of local capital, from the provincial level down to the district and village levels. Second, fully utilizing and

developing the existing material-technical bases, and continuing to build a number of new material-technical bases in accordance with the slogan "the people and the state work together," in order to stimulate the all-round development of agricultural production and develop the sectors and trades producing consumer goods and export goods. Third, consolidating and perfecting the new production relations, tied in with the consolidating the results of transformation and continuing socialist transformation. Fourth, meeting the needs of consolidating national defense, maintaining political security and social order, defeat the enemy's many-sided war of destruction, and be prepared to take the initiative in opposing all forms of the enemy's war of destruction.

In order to resolve the food problem, in addition to going all-out to develop the production of rice, subsidiary food crops, and vegetables, promoting animal husbandry to create conditions for intensive cultivation in order to increase the average per-capita grain output from 250 kilos to 300 kilos, we are simultaneously carrying out a whole series of other measures. Those measures include promoting the planned parenthood campaign, organizing the sending of people to develop new economic zones outside the province, and maintaining the province's population at about 1,850,000. We must continue to campaign for the other categories of people, cadres, workers, officials, and members of the armed forces to participate in food production in order to meet part of their needs. We must increase the exporting of agricultural products, forestry products, and marine products in order to import additional POL, fertilizer, and insecticides for agriculture, so that we can have additional capabilities for intensive cultivation and for increasing crop yields and raw materials for the consumer-goods industry, and have additional goods to exchange with the peasants for grain. The requisition-purchasing work must that the state controls 90,000 to 100,000 tons of grain, enough to meet needs. The grain market must be well managed, absolute economy must be practiced in grain consumption, and the people's diet must be improved by increasing vegetables and subsidiary foods and reducing rice.

With regard to clothing, in addition to the restoration of the cotton-growing, cloth-weaving, and sericulture trades, we must export raw silk and silk cloth in exchange for textile fibers, and contract out the weaving of cloth from raw materials provided by the central and provincial levels, with at least three-fourths of the rattan products being exported to purchase cloth, and endeavor to ensure that there are two meters of cloth for everyone by 1985.

With regard to consumer goods, by promoting the production of industrial crops, exploiting forestry products and maritime products, fully utilizing raw materials, creating on-the-spot sources of raw materials, seek all ways to have electricity, coal, and chemicals for export, and create additional sectors and trades in order to produce sufficient salt, rush mats, paper, soap, porcelain, medicine, aluminum products, plastic products, woven rattan and bamboo products, wooden products, school supplies, and toys, and between 50 and 70 percent of the various kinds of bicycle parts.

With regard to exports, we must promote the production of a number of principal products which can be produced on a large scale and have high export value, such as red pepper, black pepper, rattan, etc. There is a material incentives policy so that

every person, every household, and every sector will produce export goods, fulfill norms assigned by the central echelon, gradually increase the value of local exports, and double the value of export goods produced in the province.

We are stepping up our efforts to rectify distribution and circulation, resolve a number of problems in economic management, perfect the contracting-out of agricultural output, implement the amendments and supplements to Decision 25-CP regarding industry, and create a source of capital (money, grain, and materials) from the provincial and district levels down to the basic level.

The key, central link in the organizational work in Binh Tri Thien is developing the district and basic levels. The most urgent task is concentrating on building up the basic levels in order to, on the basis of strong bases, develop the district level. In addition to strengthening and building the party we are perfecting the state apparatus, invigorating the cadre work and, above all, being concerned with implementing plans to train and cultivate cadres at the basic level.

In the course of political activities the party organizations from the district, city, and municipal levels down to the basic level have attained a high degree of unanimity toward the report of the provincial VCP committee on the objectives, direction, and specific measures for implementing the resolution of the Fifth Party Congress. We are confident that the basic-level party organizations in the province have new determination and a strong will to lead the mass revolutionary movement in fulfilling the political missions and creating new, more solid advances.

5616
CSO: 4209/84

ECONOMIC PLANNING, TRADE AND FINANCE

PROBLEMS OF HO CHI MINH CITY SERVICE NETWORK DISCUSSED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Oct 82 pp 2,4

[Article by Bang Chau: "The Service Network in Ho Chi Minh City"]

[Text] Ho Chi Minh City, already highly populated (1,711 people per square kilometer), every day receives 100,000 visitors from other parts of the country and from abroad. The city is the focal point of many important transportation routes -- rail maritime, river, and air. The distribution-circulation activities are quite seething. The requirements for services are great.

The city's services include hundreds of trades, the most notable of which are such major trades as electrical machinery repair, tailoring, hair styling and cutting, laundry, dry cleaning, shoe and sandal repairing, hotels, and garages.

During the past several years, under the guidance of Municipal People's Committee, the service activities of the state installations have taken form and have gradually been expanded. The Commercial Service, the Restaurant-Hotel Service, and a number of specialized commercial and production corporations of the central organs and some large precincts and districts have opened tailoring shops, beauty shops, and shops to repair bicycles, motor-bicycles, radios, electrical appliances, watches, and shoes.

The activities of such shops have the confidence of the masses with regard to prices, and to a degree with regard to quality. But many service bases are too small and service is not yet convenient and appropriate to the consumption tastes and habits of the city's residents. Furthermore, the state shops are too few in number in comparison to the "sea" of private shops. There are more than 20 state beauty and barber shops (of the Commercial Service and the Restaurant-Hotel Service), which have more than 200 employees and an income of 1 million dong, while there are 2,000 family-operated shops with more than 5,000 workers and an income of more than 5,000 workers and an income of more than 25 million dong. The state tailoring shops meet only 2 to 5 percent of the needs. The state, joint public-private, and cooperative restaurants account for only 30 percent of the total, and the automobile repair bases can meet only 10 percent of the repair needs of the communications-transportation sector.

The state service forces are thin and weak, and are still developing slowly, so they are not yet capable of holding down the private service prices. On holidays and

during Tet prices increase greatly. The Municipal People's Committee has investigated and fined service installations which increase prices, but it has not done so on a regular basis and does not yet work with the precincts, districts, and organs in the city in order to attain good results. Furthermore, the quality of the service of some state installations is still deficient. They are inflexible and are not abreast of the needs of the consumers. Their hours of operation are still restricted to official hours. A number of tailoring, watch repair, and vehicle repair installations take too much time, which inconveniences the customers.

Meanwhile, private services have developed extensively. In 1980 there were 16,000 households engaged in specialized commerce, not counting those in the restaurant business, which had a total invested capital of more than 30 million dong and employed more than 6,000 workers. In 1981 their income amounted to more than 300 million workers and they employed 30,000 workers, principally in the large precincts such as precincts 1, 3, 5, 6, and 11. They were engaged in all sorts of trades, from selling lottery tickets and watching over parked vehicles to repairing electrical machinery, shoes and machinery, and air conditioners, tailoring clothing, repairing bicycles, motorbicycles, TV sets, etc. There were even beauty shops. The prices rise arbitrarily, especially during holidays and Tet. The Financial Service set the price of watching over a motorbicycle at .5 dong, but people who watch over bicycles usually charge 1 dong, or at times 2 or 3 dong. It normally costs 70 dong to have a man's suit tailored, but sometimes the price rises to 130 dong, etc. Who benefits from such services? It is most evident that the workers who receive state salaries encounter the most difficulties.

In order to stabilize the lives of the people, above all the workers, the city has a plan to rectify and expand the service activities of the state and collective units. The commercial, restaurant, and hotel sectors, and the precincts and districts, are using many forms, such as joint operations with private individuals or bringing technically qualified individuals into the state service network, in order to expand capabilities and improve the quality of service. There is a policy for appropriately compensating people with good skills. During the initial phase, it is necessary to determine which trades are necessary for life and production in the locality, and to invest in those trades so that they can develop rapidly. Consolidating and improving the quality of the existing state installations is an extremely important task so that such places can be capable of controlling market prices and create confidence among the customers.

Cooperative commerce plays a considerable role in developing services in the subwards and villages. The consumer and marketing cooperatives can develop such ordinary services as tailoring, barbering, and repairing appliances.

The precincts, districts, subwards, and villages must more closely manage private services and guide the private bases in posting prices and observing the posted prices, rationally use the tax tool to regulate incomes, and appropriately deal with illegal livelihood.

During the recent period services have developed slowly because the division of labor and organization is not explicit. The problem that is posed is to exploit all capabilities of each type of service, and combine them to form a service network that is organized, planned and attains increasingly higher effectiveness.

5616

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AGRICULTURE

REASON FOR LANDSLIDES IN CENTRAL VIETNAM EXPLAINED

Hanoi HANOI MOI in Vietnamese 25 Oct 82 p 2

[Article by Hoang Hung of the Phu Khanh Water Conservancy Service: "Landslides in the Central Coastal Provinces"]

[Text] During the past several years, in a number of central provinces, during the rainy season there have often occurred the phenomenon of landslides. Sometimes a large chunk of a mountain collapses and thousands of cubic meters of earth cover fields, roads, bridges, etc. During the storms and floods at the end of 1981 Nghia Binh and Phu Khanh provinces had to expend hundreds of thousands of workdays to clean up hundreds of thousands of cubic meters of earth and rock because of landslides on mountains and hills. The railroads and roads passing through the two provinces were cut off for many days. When there are heavy rains the mud, sand, earth and rock pouring down from the hills covers the roads and blocks the drainage systems in some villages and towns near the mountains and hills in those two provinces. The city of Cam Ranh in Phu Khanh is an example. The landslides are a result of the haphazard destruction of forests. In the past, the U.S. imperialists deliberately "cleared" our hills and mountains to serve their aggressive plot. Today, because of our thoughtless activities "denudation" is even more serious.

The destruction of forests causes the loss of the ground cover vegetation, which leads to soil erosion and ultimately to earthslides. Another serious consequence of the destruction of forests is that the flood formation time is reduced and the rate at which floodwater causes damage is increased. That very clearly is a result of the destruction of the ground cover vegetation: since the rain is not stopped by forests, the water flows freely. Therefore, as soon as there are heavy rains there are major floods. Due to the topographical characteristics of a number of central coastal provinces with steeply inclined watersheds, the denudation of mountains and hills has even more greatly accelerated the formation of floods and increased the velocity of runoff water.

Water from the gullies and streams empties into rivers and then flows out to sea. On a year-round basis, the rivers carry along their course only a certain quantity of mud and sand. But because of the denudation of forests, the effect of soil erosion is greater. The amount of mud and sand flowing out to sea each time there is runoff water suddenly increases, which causes the river channel to be unable to carry it and to deposit it along the way and silt up the river mouths. The haphazard destruction of forests has contributed to accelerating the process of silting the river mouths.

In history, as well as during the past few years, a number of river mouths in the central coastal provinces, such as the An Du mouth of the Lai Giang River in Nghia Binh and the Da Nong mouth of the Ban Thach River mouths in Phu Khanh, etc., have been filled in many times. The obstruction of river mouths leads to very serious circumstances. For example, once the An Du mouth of the Lai Giang River was obstructed and many hamlets in the villages of Hoai Huong and Hoai My in Hoai Nhon District were submerged in floodwater for many days. During the flood at the end of 1981, the mouth of the Ban Trach River was blocked, which seriously threatened the lives and property of the people in many villages near the mouth of the river, and even affected the low-lying areas near the mouth of the Da Rang River.

A study has shown that in Nghia Binh and Phu Khanh provinces there are a number of river mouths which are following an increasingly bad tendency. Because of the imbalanced reciprocal effect exerted by the meteorological, hydrological, and geological factors, those river mouths undergo complicated movements every year, which considerably affects transportation, fishing, and especially capability to handle runoff water. The Da Rang River, one of the largest rivers in the central region, has a flow of more than 80,000 cubic meters of water per second after heavy rainfalls. Every year it carries out to sea more than 1.2 million tons of mud and sand and more than 8 billion cubic quantities of mud and sand we can clearly realize the great role played by the Da Rang River in carrying away runoff water. Over the course of many years, however, it has undergone very complicated changes which have very greatly affected transportation and fishing and especially has threatened the highly populated area near the river mouth in Tuy Hoa City.

From the above analyses we can see that afforestation in the watersheds, the greening of denuded hills to counter erosion and landslides, the dredging of river mouths, the improvement of river channels to increase their ability to handle runoff water, etc., in order to limit the damage done by storms and floods, are very great and urgent problems which we must be concerned with resolving.

5616

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AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF SMALL WATER CONSERVANCY PROJECTS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 21 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Small Water Conservancy Projects"]

[Text] Each type of water conservancy project has its own important position and role, depending on the specific natural and production conditions of each place. Some areas must build large or medium projects, while other areas need only small projects. The large projects have the mission of essentially resolving the water problem for a large area, but they require large investment and a long construction period. Small water conservancy projects can be built quickly, are not costly, and are built principally by manual methods and by means of local labor, simple tools, and materials. They begin to have an effect immediately after they are built. They are projects which are capable of exploiting small and medium areas, from an area of several dozen square meters by means of simple irrigation facilities (ponds, wells, bailing buckets, water wheels, bailing baskets, pedal-operated wheels, etc., to fields of several thousand and tens of thousands of hectares, by means of canal and ditch systems and the various kinds of dikes, combined with central installations. It is possible to build, and develop and bring into play such projects on the various kinds of terrain, from high-altitude areas to the coastal areas, gravel, sandy soil, acidic and saline soil, and marshland.

Some localities regard small construction projects lightly and tend toward the construction of large projects, even in places where smaller projects should be built. Many large projects are built but they are not complete. Some central projects are only half-finished because of a lack of capital and materials. Others are completed but do not have sufficient canals and ditches, or else the ditches become filled in or collapse, which wastes water and prevents the water from reaching the fields. Many other water conservancy projects have not met the designed capacity, which wastes manpower and wealth and limits the capability of expanding production.

The expansion and consolidation of the small water conservancy networks in the irrigation systems serve in a practical way to bring water to the fields and improve the irrigation and drainage capability of the central projects. Before there are conditions for building large systems, because they have developed small and medium water conservancy projects the uncultivated areas have been developed rapidly and have produced harvests. Because the small water conservancy networks were completed and their quality improved, in the habitually cultivated areas within the

existing irrigation systems conditions have been created for increasing the number of growing seasons and practicing intensive cultivation. More than 300,000 hectares of winter crop land in the north and more than 1 million hectares of winter-spring and summer-fall crop land in the south have been rapidly expanded and provide millions of tons of grain, above all because of small and medium irrigations networks, along with other technical and management factors. The building of small water conservancy projects is becoming a strong mass movement in many localities in the south. At a time when there are as yet no conditions for building large central projects, it is possible to close off small areas and fields by such works as field dikes, area dikes, drainage sluices, drainage ditches, irrigation ditches, etc., which are connected with the major drainage and irrigation arteries, in order to retain fresh water, prevent salinization, purge acidity, and prevent flooding and waterlogging.

The localities and production plans must have plans to launch strong mass movements to build small water conservancy projects within and without the existing irrigation systems, in order to take full advantage of all sources of water, including rain water.

Although the building of small water conservancy projects is simple, a number of technical requirements must be met in order to attain high effectiveness. The installations must receive the guidance and assistance of the state with regard to technology, and the state must provide part of the equipment the installations do not have.

The small water conservancy projects are constructed only on the basis of water conservancy plans that have been determined for each area and systems, so that in the future they will not conflict with the area's over-all network, but will constitute integral parts. The small projects must be calculated and categorized in advance in order to make appropriate investments in their construction and to combine short-range benefit with long-range benefit. Some are relatively permanent, some are built for only a season, some will be usable in the future when central systems are built, and some will have to be dismantled.

The small water conservancy projects must also be organized, managed, maintained, and repaired, essentially by the local people. During the past several production seasons, the places which have applied the system of contracting out output have done a good job of building small irrigation projects, extended "fishbone" ditches to each paddy, and built leakproof ditch banks. They have used less water than in the past but have still had sufficient water in the paddies throughout the season, even during periods of drought or flooding.

The district is the echelon which directly guides the construction of small water conservancy projects. The district people's committee must have a plan to cooperate closely with the responsible sectors in order to provide practical assistance to the installations so that they can do a good job of building small water conservancy projects in the sphere of the district in accordance with the spirit of the Fifth Party Congress resolution which, with regard to the water conservancy work, stated that "The completion of the existing water conservancy projects and the building of new medium and small projects must be emphasized, and we must prepare conditions for building large water conservancy projects."

5616

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AGRICULTURE

'NHAN DAN' EDITORIAL CALLS FOR EXPANSION OF LEGUME CROPS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Oct 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Expand the Production of Legume Crops"]

[Text] The winter and spring seasons are the principal seasons for planting legume crops of temperate and tropical origin. Our country has many legume groups which are appropriate to the natural conditions and traditional practices of each area, such as soybeans, mung beans, black beans, white beans, green beans, and the other kinds of legumes.

Legumes are plants with the highest protein content and have a considerable ratio of sugar and fat. They have long been regarded as valuable food crops, and in some places they are regarded as precious foodstuffs. A number of thick-stemmed legumes with a large amount of foilage are used as green fertilizer and their stems are used as cooking fuel. Examples are sesbania, crotalaria striata, tephrosia candida, etc. Legume crops have a special characteristic other crops do not have: they assimilate and fix nitrogen from the air by means of roots with nodules.

During the past several years, a number of legume crops have developed rapidly, especially soybeans, which increased from 35,000 hectares in 1979 to nearly 80,000 hectares in 1981. During the first 9 months of this year they have increased by 22.6 percent over the same period in 1981. Peanuts have also increased by 3.2 percent over the same period last year. A number of basic research projects regarding cultivation techniques have brought about practical results, especially with regard to such principal crops as soybeans and peanuts. Many places have selected and crossbred soybean and peanut varieties which produce high yields and have good resistance to insects and diseases. Many legume crops have been made part of crop-rotation systems and interplanted with rice and subsidiary food crops and with short-term and long-term industrial crops, which is good for the grain crops and industrial crops and increases the output of legumes. The crop-rotation formula of two wet-rice crops and a dry-planted legume crop on a cultivated area in the same year is clearly more beneficial than replacing the legume crop with some other crop.

However, the expansion of the production of legume crops is, in general, still slow and is not uniform. In some respects there has been a decline, and the requirements of the plan and the demands of social life and of many economic sectors which use legume products have not been met. No legume crop, including soybeans, has attained

the annual plan norm. Of a total cultivated area of more than 6 million hectares, the area planted in the various food legume crops during the past 5 years has not exceeded the too-low total of about 200,000 to 250,000 hectares.

The principal reason for the above-mentioned situation is that the guidance and the organization and implementation measures of the localities and the responsible sectors are not yet adequate. In addition to a number of concentrated growing areas which receive materiel and technical assistance from the state, there are places -- accounting for most of the legume-growing area in the nation -- in which the people grow legume crops on a dispersed basis and receive no outside help. Even in the concentrated growing areas in the collective sector the legume crop production situation is not stable and in respects has declined, principally because the producers encounter specific difficulties which they cannot overcome, and they waste much effort and have high expenses. Furthermore, the producers are affected by the free market prices, calculate profit and loss, and change over to growing other, more profitable crops. Problems regarding legume crops at the basic level are not resolved promptly and effectively. Legume crops are easily damaged by insects and diseases and some crops suffer heavy losses if good preventive measures are not taken. Soybeans, for example, are affected by rust, stem borers, etc. Although they fix nitrogen, when they are planted legume crops must be spread with some nitrogenous chemical fertilizer, they must be continually tended, and soil moisture must be maintained. But there is usually a deficiency of chemical fertilizer and insecticides. Legume and bean seeds are difficult to store and because they contain protein and oil they tend to be affected by mold and beetles. The producers lack tools and facilities to protect products.

As they enter the period for planting winter and spring legume crops this year, the localities throughout the nation must launch a strong, broad people's movement to grow legumes on all kinds of land and under all climate and weather conditions, with appropriate varieties and cultivation methods. Depending on the conditions of each place, it is necessary to determine clearly the objectives for the use of the products that are produced. First of all, it is necessary to serve the daily diet.

It is necessary to create specialized production areas in accordance with the system of accounting and profitability. Attention must be paid to strengthening the material-technical bases and to setting forth rational management systems, and policies regarding prices, state purchasing, two-way exchanges, and the supplying of grain and such essential technical materials as good seeds, fertilizer, insecticides, tools and facilities for processing and storing products, etc.

It is necessary to expand the application of the system of contracting-out final output to workers in both the state and collective sectors with regard to all tasks. Priority should be given to providing favorable conditions for the concentrated growing areas and places which have just expanded production, as well as places with many difficulties.

Promoting an extensive movement to grow legumes throughout the nation is a practical task which brings about great benefits, first of all by improving diets, increasing output, and improving cultivated land.

5616

CSO: 4209/83

AGRICULTURE

HALF OF LONG AN RICE AREA ATTAINS YIELD OF 40 QUINTALS

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 25 Oct 82 p 2

[VNA News Release: "Long An: More Than Half of Summer-Fall Rice Area Attains Yield of 40 Quintals Per Hectare"]

[Text] To date, Long An Province has completed the harvesting of 9,500 hectares of high-yield summer-fall rice, with an average yield of more than 30 quintals per hectare. More than 5,500 hectares attained a yield of 40 quintals.

In addition to closely guiding the planting of main-planting of summer-fall rice, Long An invested technical facilities and fertilizer, and other incentives, in the high-yield rice areas made all-out efforts and overcame difficulties regarding weather and fertilizer in order to practice intensive cultivation and increase rice yields. Can Duoc and Can Giuoc provinces have nearly 900 hectares of high-yield rice land because they increased their investment of technical materials and did a good job of applying intensive cultivation measures. Therefore, yields reached 43 quintals per hectare. Because they combined the building of production collectives and the contracting-out of output to workers with the creation of high-yield rice areas, Vam Co and Ben Thu districts had more than 4,000 hectares that had yields of 40 quintals. Many collectives in Can Duoc, Can Giuoc, Vam Co, and Ben Thu districts and Tan An City had thousands of high-yield summer-fall rice that attained yields of more than 40 quintals per hectare, from 5 to 10 quintals higher than during the previous summer-fall season.

With the experience that has been gained, during the 1982-1983 winter-spring season Long An will endeavor to expand its high-yield rice area to 23,000 hectares. To date, the peasants in the province have prepared the soil and consolidated irrigation and drainage systems for nearly 20,000 hectares in preparing to put out the coming winter-spring crop.

5616

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AGRICULTURE

EDITORIAL DISCUSSES FRESHWATER PISCICULTURE

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Nov 82 p 1

[Editorial: "Develop Fresh Water Pisciculture"]

[Text] Fully using all water areas to keep freshwater fish has been a traditional occupation of our people. The "vegetable garden, fish pond" motto illustrates the composition of our familiar meals. Under the present circumstances in our country and in comparison with sea fishing, freshwater pisciculture is a business which proves less expensive, which brings about great economic effects quickly and which promotes the people's life realistically. As the saying goes, "farming must be carried out first on ponds and second on gardens," these two occupations have been closely related to the subsistence of our peasants who earn their living by performing labor and working on the land.

Within the scope of the agricultural production plan, beside the development of cultivation and animal husbandry, the development of pisciculture is considered to be an important task for which increasingly high norms on area, productivity and yield have been set with the foremost objective of meeting the society's need for food products. Freshwater fish constitutes half of the gross output of fish caught and consumed each year. The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress points out: All water surfaces must be fully used to broadly develop the breeding of fish, shrimp and other marine products and to raise the catch of sea fish and kept fish in 1985 to about 700,000 tons (of which the sea fish catch will represent 470,000 to 500,000 tons).

To date, a total water area of nearly 232,000 hectares has been used to breed fish and the people's movement for pisciculture is spreading everywhere. Many ponds, lakes and large and small water areas scattered among the residential centers, countryside and cities from the delta to the mountainous region have become on-the-spot supply sources of fresh foodstuffs for households, cooperatives, public agencies, enterprises, schools and the armed forces. The old habit of putting the fry into water and letting them grow up naturally has been replaced by fish breeding methods in accordance with technical regulations and by using water areas highly effectively. Fish species with different nutritional requirements have been kept in a mixed manner in different water layers. Attention has been paid to the in-depth development of the marine products breeding movement. The movement to develop "Uncle Ho's Fish Ponds"

has been improved continuously from the points of view of quality and economic and technical contents and is being developed vigorously. Many units have managed to combine pisciculture with rice cultivation and hog and duck raising and some of them have obtained a fish output of 5 to 10 tons per hectare of pond. Certain localities have kept fish in coops or rafts placed in rivers and have achieved a high yield, etc.

For many years, pisciculture has made progress but many huge potentials have not yet been exploited. Throughout the country there are about 2.5 million hectares of water surface including ponds, lakes and fields (but excluding rivers and canals). There are dozens of types of marine products which have been bred with a high economic value and which live in all water regions. Broad sections of the rural laboring people are versed and highly experienced in breeding fish, shrimp and other species of marine products. At present, only nearly 20 percent of the [total] water area is being used to breed fish, however. The production of fish kept in many water areas is still low. Many localities have only put the fry into water without feeding them while others have used ponds only to grow duckweed or have simply left ponds fallow. Certain regions have conducted a fish breeding movement but lack breeding fish and materials while a number of localities have failed to consider the breeding and cultivation of marine products important and have used the capital and materials supplied for pisciculture to carry out other activities. While many areas lack breeding fish or have a surplus of fry, certain people, prompted by a desire to make a quick personal profit, have engaged in young fish dealings, thus hampering the production of breeding fish and limiting the expansion of pisciculture. The source of fish kept in rivers and lakes has not been protected well. Nor has an end be put to the practice of using explosives and catching methods that tend to destroy marine product resources. Cases of theft of fish kept in water areas managed by collectives and the state are still rampant.

Every locality in our country has the possibility of developing freshwater pisciculture. First and foremost, there must be a zoning and breeding plan. The large or small scale of each water region must be used as a basis for appropriately managing the breeding task. In small and scattered water regions, it is advisable to entrust this business to production teams or units within cooperatives or to cooperative members' families. In large water regions, various forms of business may be employed provided they are convenient and most profitable. It is possible to entrust business to individual cooperatives or to organize joint ventures among neighboring cooperatives, between the marine products sectors and cooperatives or between collectives and public agencies and enterprises in order to create conditions to invest the necessary capital, labor and technique. In areas where fields are cultivated with a wet-rice crop, teams and units belonging to cooperatives and households working on product contract must coordinate pisciculture with cultivation while continuing to carry out intensive cultivation and to fulfill the rice producing contract norm satisfactorily, with the understanding that producers are entitled to receive the amount of fish caught from the contracted fields. Since the system of end-product contract with laborers have produced an initially good result, it must be expanded continuously to collective production installations and to state-operated pisciculture installations with a view to encouraging the full and profitable use of ponds and lakes to increase the supply of food products to society. At a time when the necessary conditions

for a feed producing industry are still lacking, it is possible to feed fish by fully using the surplus products of agriculture and the on-the-spot sources of residual waters and foodstuffs. By combining pisciculture with hog and duck raising and tree planting, one can also create an on-the-spot supply of fish feed. The demand for breeding fish is increasing everyday. With its hundreds of facilities scattered from the delta to the mountainous region, the network of breeding-fish producing stations and farms is able to provide enough breeding fish to meet the requirements of pisciculture. It is necessary to develop broadly the people's movement to breed fish in all water areas and, at the same time, to rapidly form concentrated fish breeding regions with a high productivity and a large output of marketable fish in order to contribute to improving the meals of every household and collective unit.

9332

CSO: 4209/88

AGRICULTURE

EXPLOITATION OF MARINE PRODUCTS INTENSIFIED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 3 Nov 82 p 1

[Excerpt] To date, a total water area of 231,500 hectares throughout the country has been used to breed fish. The freshwater fish output obtained in the past 10 months is 108,000 tons. Since the catching of freshwater fish is carried out most intensively in the later part of the year, the marine products sector will likely be able to fulfill the yearly plan norm for the production of kept fish.

Over the past 10 months, the marine products sector has supplied Hanoi City with more than 7,200 tons of fish (including 6,500 tons of sea fish and 720 tons of freshwater fish) and 6.2 million liters of fish sauce. The Zone 1 Marine Products Corporation has assumed the task of purchasing marine products, carrying them from Nghe Tinh to Quang Ninh, receiving marine products from marine products corporations in Zones 2 and 3 and supplying them to Hanoi City. To date, the Zone 1 Marine Products Corporation has fulfilled all norms of the 1982 state plan and is trying to purchase, transport and receive more marine products for supply to Hanoi in the last months of the year and in preparation for the lunar New Year.

Fish ponds in the key military positions in the border areas of Hoang Lien Son Province have yielded over 30 tons of fish. The troops in Group B56 have spent more than 10 man-days building fish ponds by carrying earth and rocks for embankment and by taking full advantage of spring water and blocking the watercourse of brooks; as a result, they have caught 20 tons of fish in 1982. In addition to fish breeding, they have also raised hogs and bovines and grown rice.

To date, Ho Chi Minh City has used a water area of 282 hectares to raise fish and has cast into water over 10 million breeding fish of different species including more than 1 million "Phi" catfish [*Clarias fuscus*]. Binh Thanh District has a water area of 40 hectares used to breed 3 million fry of various species. To breed fish and shrimp, Duyen Hai District has zoned off water areas and canals and built dams to check the advance of backish water.

In the first 9 months of this year, fishermen in Thuan Hai Province have caught 1,015 tons of marine products including shrimp, squids, shark fins and sea slugs. By catching a large amount of marine products for export, the marine products sector in Thuan Hai has had the necessary conditions to procure equipment and materials for itself and to develop production.

AGRICULTURE

IRRIGATION UNITS FAIL TO PAY ELECTRICITY FEES

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 26 Oct 1982 p 2

[From Readers' Letters column: "Failure to Collect Water Conservancy Fees"]

[Text] Many corporations and irrigation stations do not promptly pay their electricity bills, so the electricity sector has an even greater shortage of capital for production and commerce. The Hanoi Irrigation Corporation owes nearly 7 million dong, Thanh Hoa owes about 8 million dong, Ha Nam Ninh owes even more -- 16 million dong -- etc. During recent years the management expenses of the electricity-powered irrigation systems have greatly increased. Even in years in which the weather is favorable about 400-600 kilowatts are required annually for a hectare. The Ha Nam Ninh Irrigation Corporation No 1 used 600 to 650 kilowatts, and the Thanh Chuong irrigation station in Nghe Tinh used 720 kilowatts at a time when the price of electricity increased 10-fold. But the income from irrigation fees is too low and insufficient, so the state must make up for the deficit. For example, every year Hai Hung must provide nearly 10 million dong. In the winter crop areas, practically none of the places collect irrigation fees. For a long time now the irrigation corporations have been responsible for collecting irrigation fees, but some places have had to use the district budget to make up for deficits. The collection of irrigation fees according to the number of hectares per year and collection after harvesting are contradictory to the requirements of the electricity sector (which collects monthly). When the local budget encounters difficulties, that adversely affects the operational plan of the electric power sector.

In order to resolve the above-mentioned contradictions and create conditions for serving production and commerce, we recommend that the Council of Ministers promptly promulgate regulations regarding the collection of water conservancy fees that are appropriate to the present agricultural production expenses and create conditions for the irrigation corporations to adopt cost accounting and balance income and expenditures. The local people's committees must do a good job of collecting water conservancy expenses so that they can balance the expenditures they make so that the corporations can operate and make regular payments to the electricity sector. The water conservancy corporations must take many steps to achieve rational irrigation and economize on water and electricity in order to lower production costs per irrigated unit.

Bui Ngoc Lien
(Ministry of Water Conservancy)

5616

CSO: 4209/84

HEAVY INDUSTRY AND CONSTRUCTION

HAIPHONG PORT EXPANSION PROJECTS COMPLETED

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 23 Oct 82 p 1

[Article: "At the Haiphong Port Expansion Site, Many Projects Completed Rapidly"]

[Text] In the Vietnamese-Soviet friendship emulation movement, Maritime Projects Corporation No 3 has made good use of the product contracting-out and bonus forms, which have mobilized the workers to work positively and creatively at the Haiphong Port expansion site. Labor productivity in the installation of galvanized metal roofing, the building of walls, and machinery installation at the central machine shop was 30 to 56 percent higher than the norm. The hydraulic jack workers cooperated with the crane operators to install concrete panels on the surface of the goods-storage yard at the rate of 35 to 40 panels per shift (the norm was 25 panels).

During the emulation agreement campaigns, by mid-October the cadres and workers of the Federation of Maritime Project Enterprises and the Delegation of Soviet Technicians essentially completed the construction of the central machine shop, which has an area of 3,240 square meters and consisted of building walls, installing roofing, pouring the concrete foundation, installing the internal waterpipe system, completing the installation of all three segments of the bridge crane and the installation of 28 machine tools of various types. The foundation and the first floor of the production information building have also been completed. The construction units, such as the Supply-Transportation Corporation and the Concrete Plant cooperated with the Machinery Corporation and Maritime Projects No 3 to complete a 10,070 square meters cargo-storage area with a concrete surface, 137 meters of crane tracks in Yard 2A, and light poles No 9 and No 10, and filled in 8,300 cubic meters of sand to create a foundation.

5616

CSO: 4209/83

LIGHT INDUSTRY

HANDICRAFTS WEAKENED BY IRRATIONAL INCOME DISTRIBUTION

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 5 Nov 82 p 2

[Article by Xuan Vu, of Hanoi: "Distribution of Artisans' Income in Agricultural Cooperatives"]

[Text] Since the beginning of 1982, the number of color embroiderers in Hanoi has dwindled from 23,000 to 18,000. In Dong Anh District, the number of embroiderers has decreased by more than 1,000 and that of carpet weavers by 60. They have given up handicrafts and come home to accept fields on product contract. Once again, some agricultural cooperatives have been subdivided into smaller ones, persons responsible for various trades have changed positions, production tools have been scattered and the quality of embroideries has gone down in a few areas because positive measures have not been taken to provide technical guidance and improve professional skills.

Of the many reasons for the above-mentioned situation, the principal one is the failure of the handicraft sector in the agricultural circles to distribute its income rationally and consequently to produce any effect to encourage the development of various crafts. At present, agricultural laborers engaged in handicrafts have to buy work-points. A number of cooperatives have valued man-days rather high, giving each from 10 to 15 dong. Since the average monthly embroidery output of a cooperative member is only one suit of clothes, he does not receive enough money to buy work-points after handing over the whole suit to the cooperative. Therefore, he has had to give up his craft and return home to receive fields on contract and grow melons and pears, which proves more profitable.

We would suggest that a basic survey of the handicraft situation in the agricultural sector be made to formulate a uniform principle of income distribution to persons engaged in these crafts. Laborers with a technical knowledge should have a higher income level than those doing a simple job. Concerning the business profit of cooperative members engaged in handicrafts, after deducting production expenditures and setting aside a certain amount [of income] for the agricultural cooperative's funds, it is necessary to use the remainder to solve this problem by allowing the laborers to receive their income directly under the form of money; the cooperative should not collect all the profit without giving handicraftsmen any dong because this method does not encourage production; it is also necessary to strengthen handicraft units within agricultural cooperatives. Responsible cadres should have organizational

abilities and a knowledge of artisan industry and handicrafts and their working positions should be long-term stable ones instead of being shifted about unnecessarily. Traditional types of goods and local raw materials should be used as a basis to develop handicrafts in the agricultural sector. The habit of providing superficial training in every craft must be avoided because it has proven wasteful and costly. Once handicraftsmen have been trained, they must be assigned immediately to some existing production installation; otherwise, a new installation must be set up to obtain a long-term result.

9332

CSO: 4209/88

LIGHT INDUSTRY

EDITORIAL ADVOCATES SERICULTURE DEVELOPMENT

Hanoi NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 6 Nov 82 pp 1, 4

[Editorial: "Let Every Household Grow Mulberry and Raise Silkworms"]

[Text] Growing mulberry, rearing silkworm, reeling silk from cocoons and weaving silk is a traditional occupation of our people. Formerly, sericultural regions were usually populous and rich and households engaged in this business were well-off. Distinctive silk products such as Ha Dong woven-design silk cloth (in Ha Son Binh), Ha silk (in Nghe Tinh), Phu Phong taffeta (in Nghia Binh) and Tan Chau satin (in Chau Doc) were once famous merchandises owing to their beauty and durability. Throughout many wars, the mulberry growing and silkworm rearing business has tapered off. The policy of the party and government is to restore this occupation. An area of 12,000 hectares has been rehabilitated [for this purpose] in the concentrated, specialized and intensive cultivation regions of 13 provinces. Sericulture has always been an occupation of housewives. Therefore, the agricultural sector and the Women's Union have jointly stepped up the mulberry growing and silkworm rearing movement scattered among 95 districts and 800 villages subordinate to 30 provinces and cities and over an incompletely assessed area of more than 1,600 hectares. Labor has been performed from dawn to dusk to use land fully to grow mulberry with the result that nearly 1 million meters of fabric, silk, shantung and raw fluffed silk have been produced and distributed to women and laborers. Along with the mulberry growing and silkworm rearing movement, the mountainous provinces have stepped up the movement to grow cotton (and flax where conditions are favorable); according to initial statistics, 7,000 hectares have been cultivated this year.

The movement to grow mulberry, rear silkworm, reel silk, weave silk, cultivate cotton and weave cloths in the past years and especially for more than a year now has proven to be a necessary and feasible task to be done in many localities to help solve the clothing problem on the spot. While conditions in the midland and mountainous localities are more favorable for this task, the delta province can also do this task because they have had good models. By growing mulberry, rearing silkworms, reeling silk and weaving silk cloth, we will not only have more silk and raw fluffed silk to make clothes but will also obtain silkworm chrysalides--a valuable foodstuff (from 400 to 500 kgs of silkworm chrysalides can be obtained from 1 hectare of mulberry in between 21 and 24 days)--as well as an additional amount of fertilizer to transform the soil

and perform intensive cultivation in order to increase the crops' yield and to breed fish. In view of such a composite result, mulberry growing and silkworm rearing has become a profitable business.

The resolution of the Fifth Party Congress points out: "Areas in regions with a suitable climate must be set aside for cotton planting. It is necessary to step up the growing of kenaf, hemp, flax, cotton of various kinds and wild pinapples and especially to expand widely the mulberry growing and silkworm rearing movement in order to contribute to solving the clothing problem." A widespread movement must be launched across the country, among cooperatives, production collectives, public agencies, enterprises and schools and also in each household with the purpose of growing mulberry, rearing silkworms, stepping up home economics, extensively growing five kinds of plant (vegetables, flowers, fruit, mulberry and medicinal plants) and raising five animal species (buffaloes or cows, hogs, poultry, fish, silkworms and bees).

If each district grows mulberry on 200 hectares or more, our entire country will have about 40,000 hectares of mulberry and about 15 to 16 million meters of silk, raw fluffed silk and fabric. These possibilities can be materialized with the aim of developing the self-sufficiency spirit and exploiting all of our existing potentials to meet in some measure the essential needs of the people's life.

It is possible for the mountainous provinces to fully use all capacities, lands and work forces to grow mulberry and rear silkworms, to fully use cassava leaves to feed silkworms and to grow cotton and weave cloths. Where the movement has been existing for some time, it will be possible to provide each person with 2 meters of silk and cloth in 1983 and with 3 to 5 meters in 1985; in areas where the movement has just been started, efforts must be made to provide each person with 1 meter in 1983 and between 1 and 2 meters in 1985. The delta and midland provinces must fully use all land and labor potentials to expand the mulberry growing and silkworm rearing occupation by cultivating this plant collectively and in each household so as to produce more fabrics to meet the people's clothing requirements.

Experiences drawn by many localities have demonstrated the possibility of growing mulberry and rearing silkworms in a scattered fashion and of developing this occupation under three forms--individual household work, work done jointly by a group of households and collective work done by a cooperative or production collective. Localities which organize collective production must apply the end-product contract system to further raise every laborer's sense of responsibility for production.

Though sericulture is an age-old occupation of our people, it is not an easy job for which any locality has enough experience. To develop and stabilize this mass movement, it is, therefore, necessary that the responsible agencies guide the people in matters of production technique, quickly meet production requirements such as mulberry varieties and breeding silkworm eggs, encourage innovations and apply technical progress in production, fully implement the promulgated policies and make sure that collectives and every household extensively grow mulberry and rear silkworms in order to bring about a realistic economic profit.

Growing mulberry, rearing silkworms, cultivating cotton and weaving cloths to achieve partial self-sufficiency in clothing is a major policy of our party and state. The experiences of many localities have demonstrated that our people can partially meet their clothing requirements by relying on mulberry and cotton if all levels have a correct view of this problem and provide close guidance.

9332

CSO: 4209/88

TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION

VIETNAMESE WORKERS, SOVIET TECHNICIANS COMPETE IN BUILDING HANOI BRIDGE

Hanoi LAO DONG in Vietnamese 28 Oct 82 p 1

[Article by Bui Viet Phong: "The Thang Long Bridge Project: October on the South and North Banks"]

[Text] We stood on the dike on the northern bank of the Red River. Tran Thanh, director of Bridge Corporation No 11, one of the units constructing the Thang Long Bridge, raised his hand and pointed:

"That is segment No 33. Between now and 7 November, the anniversary of the Russian October Revolution, we will install the steel substructure of segment No 36. Only if you recall our rate of progress at this time last year can you fully realize the efforts made by the workers here."

I looked in the direction to which he was pointing. In the midst of the vast expanse of the Red River delta the steel framework of a bridge more than 5,5000 meters long printed its shadow on the surface of the river along the northern bank. At the southern end of the bridge the steel substructure of the first span had just been erected. People felt as if two husky, imposing arms were reaching out so that they could firmly shake hands.

At his time last year, construction work began on the first steel substructure of the Thang Long Bridge. As of the end of June 1982 Bridge Corporation No 11 had completed only 21 segments. During the third quarter of this year the workers completed the erection of 11 segments, and between the end of the third quarter and the beginning of November of this year they erected six additional segments. Duong Van Ky, deputy head of Unit 114, told me:

"Our unit is going all-out to, along with the corporation, win a flag in the present emulation agreement campaign. During October of this year an agreement to achieve accomplishments to commemorate the 65th anniversary of the Russian October Revolution and the 60th anniversary of the founding of the USSR was signed by the Vietnamese cadres and workers and the Soviet technicians working at the Thang Long bridge. The two sides reached agreement about the objectives and project items that must be completed: the erection of the steel substructures of spans 3 and 4 on the northern end, the installation of a surveying guild and the erection of a crane at the southern end, the erection of roadbeds for a railroad, motorized vehicles, nonmotorized vehicles, etc.

If in the past Unit 114--headed by Nguyen Hai Dao and Duong Van Ky -- of Corporation No 11 spearhead unit in erecting steel substructures, erected a steel substructure segments in 7 to 10 days, now the workers have proposed a 3-day time period for completing the erection of a segment. They are endeavoring to erect a segment in seven shifts (three shifts a day). Not only in bridge corporations 11 and 7, but also in all other units all over the construction site, there has arisen a new spirit. When telling me about the present results and the future work, Tran Thanh, Hoang Mau Lan, and Vuong Van Hai of Bridge Corporation No 7 did not forget the arduous days of the past. When I wanted to ask why the construction rate was so slow in the past, whether it was because the workers did not go all-out or because their organization and structure held the work back, their replies were practically identical: "There were many problems. But the principal problems were caused by those two factors."

During the first days of erecting the steel substructure, the workers were not acquainted with their work, preparations were not yet good, the production line was not rationally organized, there were no just rewards and punishments, and there were no explicit rules. Those factors were also sufficient to prevent the work from making rapid progress. As for the present, they enthusiastically said:

"The motive forces were contracting-out and bonuses. You should correctly understand our contracting-out and bonuses. The men did not improve their work only to have high incomes. The cadres had to exercise close leadership."

Clearly, if one monitors an emulation campaign or the over-all developmental process of a construction project or enterprise but only pays attention to the working spirit of the workers, one will have only partial understanding. Therefore, when I heard them talk about reorganizing the production line and the work force, and about cadres having to be present when each task was carried out in order to understand the work of each worker, I was confident that they would succeed. More than anyone else, the workers would realize who the people truly "worthy" of being their leaders were.

La Huu Ly and Phan Cong Binh were very busy in the office of the enterprises's trade union office. There was a lot of work to be done but there were few people to do the work. They were competing with the bureau in setting up two inspection teams to monitor guidance and assist the movement.

"There is something new in the present emulation campaign which, although small, is worthy of mention," said Ly, "that the new element was establishing specific norms and emulation registration for each team and department. If a unit does not register to compete, although at the end of a quarter it has surpassed its plan norm it does not receive a bonus. That is done to prevent working methods which are arbitrary and without norms. And the money bonuses are big this year."

In the present emulation campaign, the flags of Vietnam and the Soviet Union fly from pier No 4 on the northern end and pier No 14 on the southern end. If a unit wins a flag, that unit will be the most outstanding unit and will be receive a bonus of 10,000 dong. Furthermore, there are many other prizes for the different tasks. The Vietnam Confederation of Trade Unions and the trade union of the Soviet technicians also have a separate award flag and separate bonuses for units which complete their work in correct accordance with the state plan. When I asked who would be rewarded

if both end of the bridge or two units won flags within the stipulated time, Binh and Ly replied, "We would reward both. Both units would be rewarded and thus our happiness will be doubled."

During October at the Thang Long bridge construction site the Soviet technicians were also very pleased when they saw that the construction rate had increased very clearly during the very first days. Comrade Kuzaminski, secretary of the technicians' trade union, and the engineers Achemov, Dimitriev, etc., continually monitored the construction rate in order to promptly deal with the technical problems in such tasks as installing surveying guides, erecting suspension substructures, etc. Those comrades were truly moved when they saw that the Vietnamese cadres and workers regarded the Soviet holidays as their own. That sentiment is manifested not only in the flags and slogans regarding close friendship, but is also manifested in the Vietnamese workers' all-out efforts, their smiles, and their firm handshakes when they change shifts.

At the end of October the Red River is in the last part of the flood season. The sky is blue and it is sunny. The weather is now ideal for the bridge workers and for the friendly emulation campaign.

5616

CSO: 4209/71

LABOR

EXPORT OF LABORERS TO SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ASSESSED

Hanoi THANH NIEN in Vietnamese No 9, Sep 82 pp 4, 5, 20

[Article by Vu Quoc Hung: "Strengthening Youth Union Work in Selecting Youths for Labor Cooperation With Fraternal Socialist Nations"]

[Text] Our state policy of labor cooperation with fraternal socialist countries has been carried out in the past 2 years. That policy consists of highly correct guidelines and measures designed to meet immediate and long-term requirements in the rational use of our plentiful labor source and as a contribution to training new ranks of workers for the future.

In line with that spirit, we are now selecting a body of persons with vocational skills. They are fresh graduates from domestic and foreign vocational schools, and workers and civil servants from enterprises and organs, intent on strengthening and improving their vocational skills and professional expertise. These men and women constitute the hard core of the labor force sent to friendly countries for cooperation purposes. At the same time, we also send abroad youths of work-age having completed basic general education but still having no skills, with preference given to demobilized armymen, and children and brothers of war heroes, workers and civil servants in industrial zones and cities. At the end of their contracted tours of study and work in friendly countries, these youths of both sexes will become technical workers specializing in skills previously agreed upon by us and our friends. Hence, the selection process must ensure, not only quantity, but also standards of political quality, morality, academic standing and health on the part of departees.

The state has issued--and continues to improve--procedures and policies aimed at meeting the laborers' rights and obligations. They receive wages, social insurance and other benefits similar or equivalent to their counterparts' income in friendly countries. However, our people are bound strictly to carry out all labor contracts and accords, as well as commitments between us and friends; they must work and study properly, respect the law in friendly countries, forge socialist virtues, and maintain and promote fine Vietnamese traditions. And upon return to the fatherland, they must accept any jobs assigned them by state organs. They are obliged to pay from 10 to 15 percent of their basic income to the state to compensate for farewell and homecoming party costs, and to resolve future claims, contributing to building and defending the fatherland.

Those who are sent back as a result of disciplinary measures must be made to pay back part of the cost according to state regulations.

Organs of the party, state and mass organizations from the central to basic echelons are bound to take part in carrying out the policy of labor cooperation, with the Ministry of Labor acting as a prime mover.

International labor cooperation between brotherly socialist countries is one of the conditions which help our youths achieve the right to learn a skill, to work, expand professional know-how, and acquire advanced science and technology. At the same time, it also provides Vietnamese youths with the opportunity to participate in building progressive socialism in fraternal nations.

In essence, international labor cooperation means, in no way, labor export. The main purpose of labor export is to earn foreign currency, adding up to the capital invested in the national economy.

The export of specialists and workers is a fairly widespread activity in the world. At present, a great deal of specialists and workers from many countries are working under economic contracts in a number of nations in Africa, the Middle and Near East. To export a labor force composed of specialists and workers calls for a period of preparation in many respects, focusing especially on technical know-how and foreign language proficiency. Imperialists and international reactionaries are bending over backward to denigrate this aim of labor cooperation between us and brotherly socialist countries. But glowing realities were and will be proof against their fallacious arguments.

Up to now, there have been tens of thousands of Vietnamese youths of both sexes in the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and the Democratic Republic of Germany, learning vocational skills and working. In just a short time, they have overcome many difficulties and ensured that accords signed with friendly countries have been carried out.

A majority of Vietnamese laborers in friendly countries work hard, strive to learn, and adjust quickly to the conditions of advanced industrial production; and in general, they have fulfilled the economic and technical norms set by friendly countries. In daily life, they are modest and simple, adhere properly to labor discipline, and show adequate political consciousness, and a readiness to unite with friends. A number of our youths have quickly acquired vocational skills and attained a high degree of finesse in such trades as welding, fitting, textile, masonry, etc. In many places, the ranks of Vietnamese laborers are trusted and appreciated by friends.

Aside from these fundamental pluses, a number of men and women living abroad as cooperative laborers have displayed negative manifestations such as an uncivilized lifestyle, observing neither order nor hygiene in eating and living quarters, lacking respect for public order and violating the statutes of host countries, as well as our own. Worse yet, some were given to unrestrained eating and drinking bouts, often leading to provocations and

fistfights.... Just as "a worm can spoil a pot of soup," these activities prompted friendly people to have ill feelings toward us, to the frustration of other compatriots of both sexes anxious to maintain national dignity and to foster congenial ties with friends. These

These negative manifestations stemmed from many causes, the most striking of which lay clearly in a lax selection process, during which many places failed to comply correctly with state selection regulations. Union participation in the selection task, in pursuance of these state regulations, still was fraught with flaws. Nearly all provincial and municipal unions have shown no true interest in the selection task. Only in a few places at the basic level has the union succeeded in taking part actively in the selection task, and in struggling against mistaken manifestations in sending cooperative laborers overseas; generally speaking, in many places union participation was just a formality--if not "forgotten." Predeparture preparedness for our laborers still was careless (maybe because it was too short), not enough for them to understand thoroughly their duties and responsibilities, and acquire a minimum knowledge about the land, people, customs and mores of host countries. Predeparture propaganda--if ever carried out--was equally dull and one-sided, inducing departing laborers to consider their trip a tourist trip, and nurture the illusion that they could earn "more money with less work." As a matter of fact, these people have become low-spirited, desperate and prone to negativism upon coming in contact with the mechanism of a big socialist production system, which requires a laborers discipline, quality and high efficiency, in total contrast to aberrant, careless and whimsical practices.

Organizational preparedness was equally weak, boding ill for the management task--failure to keep up the number of core cadres, and to fully take care of organizational procedures facing the departees, many of whom upon arrival in friendly countries claimed to be union "members," without being able to submit corroborating documents.

Another regrettable fact is that a number of departee families have not yet prepared for a correct concept on labor cooperation, which they even saw as an opportunity to make a fast buck, resulting therefore in improper actions on the part of departees.

Representing the youths' right to collective influence union committee echelons must properly fulfill their responsibilities as members of selection councils at various levels. Provincial and municipal unions must pay attention to the following:

--Guide the dissemination of positions and policies on labor cooperation, and of selection procedures emphasized by Resolution 362/CP of the Council of Ministers, Circular 08 and Official Letter 93 of the Ministry of Labor, as well as guiding documents sent by the union central committee to union basic installations.

--Actively take part in local selection and selection council activities.

--Detect selection errors and shortcomings and struggle to thwart them promptly.

-In coordination with labor bureaus and services, properly select the ranks of union unit leaders, deputy unit leaders and cadres; guide the holding of union internal activities; educate union members and youths about their responsibilities; periodically organize conferences to draw experiences with which to improve the educational task.

--Assign special cadres to keep close tabs on international labor cooperation and maintain close ties with the committee in charge of youth activities overseas in the union central committee.

At the basic level, union organization must fully understand the positions and policies regarding youth selection for labor cooperation overseas. To ensure fair and open selection, union basic installations must request selection councils to carry out the "3 down, 2 up" formula:

--The selection council sends its own list of prospective departees to the masses (through public posting).

--The masses submit their list of prospective departees to the selection council.

--The selection council informs the masses of its official list.

--The masses submit comments on that official list to the selection council.

--The selection council answers to the questions submitted by the masses.

International labor cooperation is a party and state policy, as well as a problem facing the youth. By taking special care to carry out properly this task, various union echelons will effectively contribute to implementing the "program to find employment," as stipulated by the resolutions of the 4th plenum of the union central committee.

9213

CSO: 4209/81

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

STORM DAMAGE OVERCOME IN NGHE TINH

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 22 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] VNA--On 18 October, storm No 7 landed on a region between Quynh Luu District and Vinh City (Nghe An) with force-10 to -12 winds and gusts surpassing force-13 (over 140 kms/hr) within a radius of 48 kms. It was the longest (from 0400 to 1600), greatest and most comprehensively destructive storm ever to hit this area.

The Nghe Tinh Provincial Party and People's Committees have sent many groups of cadres to help districts, especially those hard hit by the storm, to survey and assess the damage done to human beings, property, equipment and public works and, on this basis, to guide and motivate people to display a self-sufficiency spirit and to fully use local resources, labor and materials to overcome the storm aftermath strenuously and quickly and, as an immediate task, to provide boarding and lodging for the storm victims and stabilize life and production as soon as possible. Districts and villages which were not hit or were only hit slightly by the storm should give assistance to the [seriously] damaged ones. The provincial authorities have mobilized cadres and manual and office workers, requested them to work overtime, organized the drying and proper preservation of wet grain, food stuffs and merchandises and categorized the damaged rice areas in order to guide their tending, fertilization and protection and to organize the deacidification and desalinization of thousands of rice-grown hectares flooded by sea-water carrying tidal waves as well as the protection of the current rice crop and the preparations for the next one.

At present, thousands of people, cadres and workers in the province are participating in repairing houses, schools, hospitals and public offices. The teachers' advanced school of the province had all of its dwelling houses and school buildings destroyed by the storm; however, temporary lodging was provided for more than 1,000 cadres, teachers and students only 2 days after the storm. The provincial people have made temporary repairs to thousands of houses to solve the housing problem for dozens of thousands of people. Provisional stands have been set up by many grain, food, fruit and vegetable shops to serve the people.

Cadres and workers of the Vinh power plant are trying to make partial repairs to supply electricity for production and daily activities.

9332

CSO: 4209/77

HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE

SISTER PROVINCES HELP NGHE TINH OVERCOME STORM AFTERMATH

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 24 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] VNA--Over the past few days, the Vinh power plant has concentrated efforts on inspecting equipment and drying up [wet] motors so as to readily generate electricity once the wire networks are restored. Wire management team No 5 has worked hard all the time to check various lines and take care of breakdowns.

To date, the power source generated by the Vinh power plant has become stable. Many wire networks have been repaired and power has been supplied to a number of production installations and civil works. In conjunction with the electricity corporation and the electric construction and installation corporation, the power plant is urgently restoring the principal wire lines and promptly supplying power to serve production sectors.

No sooner had the great storm No 7 landed on Nghe Tinh than the public security force in Vinh City sent many units to key areas such as the Ben Thuy Port, Vinh railroad station, Cua Tien and Con Mo warehouses, Vinh market, bus stations and gateways to the city. Together with protection units at various agencies and enterprises and with army units, these public security units stood guard, maintained order and security and saved goods to reduce damage and losses of the state's and people's properties.

Public security agents in Hung Binh, Cua Nam, Hong Son and Ben Thuy Wards actively worked with the local administration to give assistance to families whose houses collapsed, to households lacking in manpower and to old and weak persons in distress.

Public security agents in Ben Thuy Ward helped grain shops shelter and safely protect 300 tons of grain, retrieved for public agencies more than five cubic meters of timber and more than 100 roofing iron sheets blown away by the wind and also recovered many other types of property for the people.

The influence of storm No 7 was also felt in Thanh Hoa where the 10th-month rice plants on nearly 40,000 hectares fell down and were submerged. The Thanh Hoa Provincial Party Committee Standing Committee met, debated and decided to motivate the provincial people to give bamboos of both the large and slender species and building materials to the storm-stricken area of Nghe Tinh so that they might restore houses, schools, hospitals, public agencies and a certain amount of grain.

When the storm faded out, Thanh Hoa sent to Nghe Tinh a delegation of the party, administration, front and some mass organizations to get information about the situation in the requirements of the stricken areas and to decide to give aid by providing the urgently necessary and appropriate things. The province [of Thanh Hoa] tried to quickly supply bamboos of the large and slender types and building materials to contribute to the local efforts to help people in the storm-stricken areas rapidly stabilize their residences and overcome the storm aftermath. The province urged its people to safeguard the 10th-month rice crop, to save the flooded rice areas quickly and to harvest areas where the rice crop had ripened in order to obtain the necessary amount of grain and create conditions to help people in the storm-stricken areas in Nghe Tinh during the coming preharvest period. The province requested the areas producing large and slender bamboos and building materials to intensify and expand production and to raise labor productivity in order to fulfill the 1982 state plan and simultaneously have enough products to aid people in the storm-stricken areas of Nghe Tinh.

On hearing of the heavy losses caused by storm No 7 to Nghe Tinh Province, teachers and students of the Quang Trung (Nghia Binh) General Middle School --a southern one which had been playing a principal role in the "2 Good" emulation movement--immediately launched a multiform movement to help schools in Vinh City rapidly overcome the storm aftermath and stabilize teaching and learning.

On the first day of the movement, teachers and students throughout the school voluntarily contributed rice, organized various tasks such as collecting scrap paper and bottles and selling them for nearly 10,000 dong and immediately sent this rice and money to the middle schools in Vinh City.

The Quang Trung General Middle School is now continuing to organize collective work sessions, film projection and other forms of activity to earn money and send it to the educational sector in Nghe Tinh to help it overcome the aftermath of storm No 7 and quickly stabilize teaching and study.

9332

CSO: 4209/77

POPULATION, CUSTOMS, AND CULTURE

THOUSANDS OF LABORERS MOVED TO NEW ECONOMIC ZONES

Hanoi QUAN DOI NHAN DAN in Vietnamese 20 Oct 82 p 1

[Text] VNA--As reported by the Labor Transfer Department (Ministry of Labor), in the first 9 months of this year, nearly 95,000 people including 50,000 laborers throughout the country were moved to build new economic zones and to reinforce various sectors, fulfilling 57 percent of the yearly plan norm for population and 73 percent of the yearly plan norm for the number of laborers. Of these laborers, more than 19,000 were moved to state-operated installations (fulfilling 53 percent of the yearly plan) and 19,230 were transferred to collective installations (fulfilling 63 percent of the yearly plan)--not to mention another 11,200 laborers who were moved and mixed with people living in other areas [which were not new economic zones].

The provinces which achieved high population transfer norms were Nghia Binh with 102 percent, Ha Nam Ninh with 100.37 percent and Binh Tri Thien with 79.4 percent of the yearly plan norm for labor transfer.

The provinces which achieved high population reception norms were Minh Hai with 110 percent, Lam Dong with 85 percent, Dac Lac with 71 percent and Dong Nai with 66 percent of the labor reception plan.

In general, people coming to new economic zones have rapidly stabilized their life and quickly started production. The more than 9,000 laborers coming from the provinces of Thai Binh, Ha Son Binh, Thanh Hoa, Binh Tri Thien and Dong Nai to the rubber plantations have contributed great efforts to opening 14,730 hectares of new land planting them with rubber trees and tending them. The 6,900-odd laborers coming from the provinces of Binh Tri Thien and Nghe Tinh to replace troops having fulfilled their obligation in the army's production units have continued to grow and tend hundreds of hectares of rubber, coffee and rice crops. Over 11,000 laborers from Nghia Binh Province have been enthusiastically building new production zones in the mountainous provinces of Dac Lac, Gia Lai-Kon Tum and Lam Dong.

9332

CSO: 4209/77

END